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"Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court
Opinions
Michael L. Wells*

Abstract
Analysis of a Supreme Court opinion ordinarilybeginsfrom the premise
that the opinion is a transparentwindow into the Court's thinking, such that
the reasons offered by the Court are, or ought to be, the reasons that account
for the holding. Scholars debate the strength of the Court's reasoning,
question or defend the Court's candor, and propose alternative ways of
justifying the ruling. This Article takes issue with the transparencypremise, on
both descriptive andnormativegrounds. Especially in controversialcases, the
Court is at least as much concerned with presentingits holding in a way that
will win allegiancefrom its audience, or at least deflect andsoften criticism.
Drawingon sociologistErving Goffinan 's study of"appearancemanagement,"
the Article shows that the Court's opinions often reflect more concern with its
audience'ssensibilitiesthan with the reasons that drive the outcomes ofcases.
The Article then considers the normative issues raised by the Court's
appearance management. It argues against blanket condemnation of the
practice,because it is not an unalloyedevil. At the same time, by identifying
the merits and demerits ofjudicial appearancemanagement, we can identify
contexts in which it may be more or less deserving of criticism.
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. Introduction
In A PoliticalCourt, Judge Richard Posner dismisses the reasoning of
many Supreme Court opinions as "professional varnish"' and a "mask,"2 behind
which the real work of deciding cases takes place. Like Judge Posner, many
readers of the Court's decisions believe we can distinguish between two kinds
of reasons: (a) those that do the work of deciding the cases, and (b) those that
are put forward for the purpose of creating an impression ofjudicial deference
to text and history.3 These are the work horses and the show horses of
1. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court,2004 Term-Foreword: A PoliticalCourt,
119 HARV. L. REv. 31,52 (2005) (asserting that "[t]here is almost no legal outcome that a really
skillful legal analyst cannot cover with a professional varnish").
2. Id. at 44, 88.
3. This distinction is a central tenet of legal realism. See BRIAN LErrER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE 16 (2007) ("[T]he core of Realism is, indeed, a certain sort of descriptive claim
about how judges decide cases according to which judges rationalize, after-the-fact, decisions
reached on other grounds." (emphasis omitted)). The tendency to favor the second sort of
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constitutional argument. The work horses consist largely of value choices
between competing political and social goals, while the show horses include, at
least some of the time,4 the "intent of the framers," precedent, and the
application of multi-part tests. Scholars have accumulated considerable
evidence of the existence of show horses: The Court advances historical
arguments when doing so suits the Court's purpose and ignores them when they
are inconvenient. 5 It cites precedents to support its rulings, yet acknowledges
that precedent is a weak constraint in constitutional cases. 6 Its formulae amount
to "an attempt to achieve one effect: that the words, once in place, will do the
work as the judges watch, recording the score."7 Meanwhile, the majority's
reason over the first may be especially prominent in Supreme Court opinions, because the
Court's docket consists largely of cases in which text, history, and other legal materials do not
furnish a clear answer. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious
DeterminantsofJudicialBehavior, 68 U. IN.L. REv. 615, 621-22 & n.39 (2000) (noting the
selection bias and policy preferences of the Supreme Court's caseload).
4. My point is not that these arguments are properly characterized as "show horses"
whenever they are advanced. My examination of them will be worthwhile so long as their role
in a significant number of the Supreme Court opinions that employ them is to decorate the
opinions rather than to produce the outcome.
5. See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,Pragmatism,and Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 581 (2000) (discussing the
Court's use of historical arguments). He states:
The legal profession's use of history is a disguise that allows the profession to
innovate without breaching judicial etiquette, which deplores both novelty and a
frank acknowledgment ofjudicial discretion and likes to pretend that decisions by
nonelected judges can be legitimated by being shown to have democratic roots in
some past legislative or constitutional enactment.
Id.
6. See Michael J.Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 903, 905 (2005) (noting that precedent "has a limited, rather than a completely absent
or robust, degree of path dependency in constitutional adjudication"); see, e.g., Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) ("[N]either history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack."); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235
(1997) (observing that the policy of stare decisis "is at its weakest when we interpret the
Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by
overruling our prior decisions"); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting that
"staredecisis is not an inexorable command" in constitutional cases); United States v. Barnett,
376 U.S. 681, 699 (1964) ("It is true that adherence to prior decisions in constitutional
adjudication is not a blind or inflexible rule."). When the Court purports to respect precedent,
the most that can be said for the precedent is that the majority does not strongly disapprove of it.
E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Whether or not we would agree
with [Mirandav. Arizona's] reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the
first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.").
7. Robert F. Nagel, The FormulaicConstitution,84 MICH.L. REv. 165, 196 (1985); see
also Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REv.
1421, 1441 (1995) (noting that this style "conveys an impression of deliberateness, of moving
step by step, of leaving no stone unturned").

1014

64 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1011 (2007)

political and social aims may drive the outcomes of hard cases even when they
receive comparatively little attention in the opinions.8 Commentators give short
shrift to the show horses. They argue over whether a given argument falls into
the show horse or the work horse category, lambaste the show horses, and then
set them aside in order to pursue serious constitutional analysis. 9 A widelyshared premise of constitutional scholarship is that the Court ought to give true
rather than false reasons.
This Article rejects that premise. My thesis is that the Court's opinions
may serve worthy goals and earn our respect even if other reasons account for
outcomes. To borrow Judge Posner's metaphor, I believe that the Court's
professional varnish and its masks deserve more scholarly attention and a
kinder assessment than they have received. Deployed with skill and prudence,
false (but widely acceptable) reasons help maintain the appearance that the
Court is in step with the broad public, to whom it is ultimately accountable.
Adept appearance management can succeed even when segments of the public
differ sharply among themselves as to the norms of constitutional adjudication.
In this way, putting an attractive face on its rulings may serve the Court's vital
institutional need for public confidence. Appreciating the role of appearance
management in ensuring the Court's institutional effectiveness enhances our
understanding of the opinions and opens the door to a whole new set of criteria
for evaluating them. In making these points, I borrow Richard Fallon's
illuminating distinction between "legal legitimacy" and "sociological
legitimacy."' 0 Legal legitimacy requires that an opinion candidly state the
reasons for the outcome.l" Sociological legitimacy is achieved by an opinion
that secures public acceptance of the Court's rulings.' 2 Badly-reasoned
8. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1194(1987) ("[A]lthough value arguments occupy the
lowest rung in the hierarchy, they are likely to exert a very powerful influence on conclusions
within other categories in a successful effort to reach coherence."); Barry Friedman, The Politics
of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 274 & n.88 (2005) ("[A]ttitudinal findings that
Supreme Court Justices vote according to their own ideology might evoke a sort of 'ho hum'
reaction on the part of the legal cognoscenti.").
9. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 1204 ("Value arguments... enjoy almost total
predominance [in] much of the most respected modem constitutional scholarship.").
10. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1787,
1795-96 (2005). Fallon also discusses "moral" legitimacy, which "is a function of moral
justifiability or respect-worthiness." Id. at 1796. This Article concentrates on the Court's
reasoning more than its outcomes, while moral legitimacy is concerned with the Court's
holdings rather than its reasoning. See infranotes 84-89 and accompanying text (distinguishing
between sociological and moral legitimacy).
11. See id at 1822-23 (describing "legal" legitimacy).
12. See id at 1790-91, 1795-96 (describing "sociological" legitimacy).
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opinions may lack legal legitimacy, yet succeed in winning sociological
legitimacy. There may be a difference between reasons that will please the
Court's audience and those that do the work of deciding cases.
As the term "sociological legitimacy" signals, this Article treats the
Justices as social actors who have a common interest in the Court's success as
an institution. Like anyone who does not live on a desert island, the Court, in
order to achieve its goals, has to be concerned with what other people think of
it.13 In any given case, and especially in the most prominent ones, the Court
must take care to behave in a way that inspires or maintains public confidence,
even as it insists on a large role for itself. In the course of resolving a case, the
Court needs to make not only legal decisions, but also strategic choices as to the
contents of the opinion. The general problem has come up in a variety of
contexts and throughout our history. To take some prominent examples, in Ex
parte McCardle,'4 the Court was faced with a statute that stripped it of
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges and had to decide not only how to
respond on the merits, but also how to compose an opinion that would appease
Congress without surrendering.1 5 It handled the dilemma by larding the
opinion with deferential rhetoric while carefully declining to address the broad
issue of congressional power.' 6 In Brown v. BoardofEducation,7 the problem
was how to strike down segregated public schools without appearing to disrupt
settled expectations too much. 18 Its solution was to cite dubious social science
evidence instead of forthrightly articulating the broad principle of racial
equality on which the result actually rested.' 9 In Bush v. Gore,20 the majority
13.

For an extended discussion of the nuances and implications of this common sense
(1959)

notion, see ERViNG GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 4-5

(suggesting that when a person interacts with others, he has an interest in controlling the
impressions others have of him, and can try to do so "by expressing himself in such a way that
will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan"). One of my aims in this
Article is to use Goffman's lens to study the Supreme Court, an institution that presents itself to
the public almost exclusively through its opinions.
14. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1868) (upholding a statute limiting the
Court's power to hear habeas corpus appeals).
15. See infranotes 191-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's dilemma in Ex
parteMcCardle).
16. Id.
17. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (finding racial segregation in
public schools unconstitutional).
18. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's approach in
Brown).

19.

Id.

20. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110(2000) (per curiam) (finding that a court ordered
recount of votes cast in a presidential election violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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rejected a plausible, though novel, theory based on Article H ofthe Constitution
in favor of equal protection reasoning that could more readily be linked to
settled doctrine, though at the cost of withering academic criticism.2'
The analysis unfolds in three steps. Part II shows that the requirements of
legal and sociological legitimacy may conflict, and offers reasons why the
Court will likely choose to sacrifice legal legitimacy for the sake of public
acceptance. Accordingly, it is fair to infer that the unspoken aim in many
"badly-reasoned" cases is to enhance the Court's standing with the relevant
segments of public opinion. My argument is that the Court's preference for
sociological legitimacy stems from its concern with the "countermajoritarian
difficulty., 22 Because the Court's constitutional rulings thwart the popular will,
the legitimacy of its interventions will often be contested, and it must take care
to ensure that people have confidence in its performance. As a result, the Court
must pay attention to public perceptions, ever on the lookout for ways to win,
or shore up, or minimize erosion of public acceptance of controversial
decisions. Over the whole range of cases the Court adjudicates, the prime
candidates for false reasons will be those in which the reasons that account for
outcomes are least widely shared, and the main test for selecting false reasons
to stand in their place will be broad acceptability.
Part III shows how this preference for acceptable (but false) reasons
influences the contents of opinions and, with the accretion of cases over time,
shapes constitutional doctrine. Some arguments, notably those that depend
heavily on the existence of constitutional values that cannot be traced
uncontroversially to the text and history of the Constitution, receive
comparatively little attention in Supreme Court opinions, despite their often
decisive role in resolving hard issues.23 Instead, the Court employs a "rhetoric
of inevitability," aimed at creating the impression that the work of deciding
the case has already been done by the framers and by prior cases.24 To this
end, it favors arguments based on precedent and the intent of the framers,
21.

See infra notes 222-35 and accompanying text (describing the controversy

surrounding the Court's decision in Bush).
22. Barry Friedman has written a series of articles chronicling the history of the
"countermajoritarian difficulty." See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153,
155 (2002) (exploring "the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected
and ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy").
23. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of ConstitutionalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REv.
2008, 2011-12 (2000) (suggesting that Supreme Court opinions "are written to make it seem
that there is only one correct result and that it was derived in a formalistic fashion that excludes
individual value choices").
24. Id.at 2008.
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and it chooses doctrinal formulae that can be deployed to resolve issues without
any apparent exercise ofjudgment.
Part IV shifts gears to consider the normative issues raised by the tension
between appearance management and the value ofjudicial candor. I defend the
Court's concern with appearances against the threshold objection that judicial
candor is the paramount value in opinion writing and identify considerations
bearing on the wisdom of the practice in a variety of contexts. In particular, the
value of appearance management must be weighed against its costs in assessing
opinions that employ this technique. Moreover, appearance management
always carries risks. While an opinion written for the purpose of managing
appearances may merely mask good (but controversial) reasons, the mask may
also be used to conceal weak arguments, or even reasons that should be off
limits to judges. Here, we can appreciate one of the merits of good doctrinal
scholarship, for its meticulous attention to the text of an opinion exposes these
abuses of appearance management.
II. Legitimacy and the Supreme Court
Government officials routinely wield power in ways that oblige persons to
comply with their commands-to pay taxes, report for jury duty, obey the
criminal law, and so on. Their commands are "legitimate" to the extent they are
entitled to our obedience, and scholars debate just what criteria they must meet
in order to deserve compliance. For most officers, the legitimacy of their
decisions is mainly a product of democratic decision making, subject only to
constitutional constraints. 25 When we complain about the acts of legislators or
executive officers, the usual answer is that in a democracy the majority has its
way.26 These officers were elected, or are responsible to other officers who
were elected for the purpose of making and implementing public policy. Their
job is to choose how to deploy limited resources among competing claims, and
the losers typically have no recourse other than the polls. But elected officers
do not enjoy absolute power. The American theory of government holds that
the democratic check on official transgressions may fall short. Accordingly, we
have enacted constitutional (and statutory) curbs on the state's power, and the

25.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-7 (1980) (discussing the

legitimacy of decisions made by the elected branches of government).
26. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1842-44 (noting the sources of legitimacy supporting the
executive and legislative branches).
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role of courts is to enforce those limits. 27 But judges, too, are supposed to be

constrained by law, and they, too, must legitimize their rulings.
A. Three Kinds of Legitimacy
For judges, and especially for Supreme Court Justices, achieving
legitimacy presents different and greater challenges than those faced by elected
officials and their underlings. Federal judges are not elected to policy-making
posts and are not directly accountable to anyone. Yet the Court may thwart the
will of the democratic branches by handing down constitutional rulings that
cannot be overturned through the ordinary legislative process. Unsurprisingly,
the practice is controversial, and American scholars have labored long and hard
over the conflict between majority rule and judicial authority.2 8 Along the way,
they have spun out many theories designed to justify, explain, and critique what
judges do.29
Insofar as the Court is concerned, academic theories may not be adequate
to the task at hand. The pressures and constraints it faces go well beyond the
need to satisfy a law professor's theory of judicial review, for legitimacy is
neither a unitary concept nor an unambiguous one. In a recent article, Richard
Fallon provides a helpful starting point. 30 He sets out "to clarify what we
characteristically mean when we talk about legitimacy, especially in
constitutional law.'0' 1 His article distinguishes between "three kinds of
standards that produce different concepts of legitimacy-legal, sociological,
and moral 3 2 and shows that each figures in the debate over whether a given
judicial decision or other act of government is legitimate or not.33 Thus, "legal
27. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137(1803) (outlining the core principle of
judicial review). Not every legal objection against legislative and executive officials will entail

a claim of illegitimacy. But every claim of illegitimacy must be based on an assertion of
illegality.
28. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1821 ("The gravest difficulty in assessing charges of
legally illegitimate judicial decisionmaking arises from disagreement about the legal bounds of
judicial authority under the Constitution."). A British observer points out that Americans, due
to the institution ofjudicial review, devote an especially large amount of intellectual firepower
to this general issue. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSoPHY 122-25
(1983) (examining the "concentration of American thought on the judicial process").

29.

See Friedman,supra note 22, at 167-215 (exploring the "academic attention" given to

the countermajoritarian problem in the mid-twentieth century).
30. See Fallon, supra note 10, 1813-42 (describing "judicial" legitimacy).

31. Id.at 1790.
32. Id. at 1794.
33.

See id.at 1851-53 (concluding that these three concepts of legitimacy impact the

"SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY"

1019

legitimacy and illegitimacy depend on legal norms. '34 By contrast, "[w]hen the
sense, legitimacy is a function of moral justifiability or
term is used in a moral
35
respect-worthiness.
Assessments of the legal and moral legitimacy of judicial action entail
normative judgments. Sociological legitimacy, on the other hand, is a
descriptive concept in Fallon's model: "When legitimacy is measured in
sociological terms, a constitutional regime, governmental institution, or official
decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar as the relevant public
regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons
beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward. 3 6 Sociological
legitimacy "in a weak sense" is a matter of "mere acquiescence."3 7 It exists
when "the public, or broad sections of it, have not overtly resisted claims of
political authority. 3 8 The article goes on to delineate the interrelations and
conflicts among these three strands of legitimacy. For example, the "legally"
legitimate ruling in a given case may differ from the "sociologically" legitimate
one if one view enjoys widespread public support, while the other finds more
favor in the legal materials. 39 By untangling the three strands of legitimacy,
enhanced
Fallon aims for "increased understanding of constitutional debates,
40
expression."
clearer
for
potential
the
and
thought,
of
precision
Starting with Fallon's three-part conception of legitimacy, I pursue a
different inquiry. My aim is to consider the bearing of the three aspects of
legitimacy-especially sociological and legal legitimacy--on the opinionwriting strategies of Supreme Court Justices. Three sets of criteria for
evaluating opinions imply three sets of criteria for writing them as well.
Whatever the outcome of a case, the holding may be justified by reasons that
satisfy the requirements of legal, moral, or sociological legitimacy, or some
combination of the three. Consequently, the three-part nature of legitimacy
sometimes obliges the Court to make choices as to how to justify outcomes,
even when achieving legitimacy is its sole goal. 41 The point here is not that
decisionmaking of courts and public officials).
34. Id.
35. Id.at 1796.
36. Id.at 1795.
37. Id.at 1796.
38. Id.
39. See id.at 1850 (noting "the potential for conflict" among these concepts of
legitimacy).
40. Id.at 1791.
at 1790 ("[T]he term legitimacy invites appeal to three distinct kinds of criteria
41. See id.
that in turn support three concepts of legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral.").
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every case requires such a choice. If the demands of legal, moral, and
sociological legitimacy are all satisfied by the same set of reasons for the
holding in a case, then no choices need to be made among the three. The vast
majority of cases adjudicated by federal and state courts fit this description.
Still, the requirements of the three types of legitimacy may point in different
directions, and cases in which this is so are disproportionately likely to turn up
on the Supreme Court's docket, simply because the Court typically selects the
thorniest issues for review.42 This difference between the Supreme Court and
lower courts explains why my focus is on the Supreme Court. To the extent
sociological legitimacy influences the content of opinions, its impact will be
more pronounced in Supreme Court opinions than in decisions of lower courts.
B. Sociological Versus Legal Legitimacy
Legal professionals ordinarily work from the premise that legal, not
sociological, legitimacy is the Supreme Court's guideline. Supreme Court
opinions show how the Court reasoned its way from the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, precedents and other legal materials to the holding in the
case at hand. 43 By assuring that the Court's ruling complies with the law, 44 the
opinion demonstrates that the majority has satisfied the requirements of legal
legitimacy. 45 To this end, the opinion must consist of a full and candid
42. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinantsof
JudicialBehavior,68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615, 621-22 & n.39 (2000) (suggesting that, more often
than not, the Court grants certiorari in cases in which Justices have strong policy preferences).
43. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 219 (1986) ("Integrity demands that the
public standards of the community be both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a
single, coherent scheme of justice and fairness in the right relation."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
"The Rule ofLaw"As a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18 & n.79
(1997) (describing the Legal Process view that adherence to the rule of law entails, among other
things, "reasoned elaboration of the connection between recognized, pre-existing sources of
legal authority and the determination of rights and responsibilities in particular cases"); James
B. White, What's an Opinion For?,62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1363, 1367-68 (1995) (arguing that "[i]t
is... in the creation of legal authority.., that the opinion performs its peculiar and most
important task," and that makes "two claims of authority: for the texts and judgments to which
it appeals, and for the methods by which it works"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role ofReason
in the Rule of Law, 56 U. Cmi. L. REv. 779, 792-98 (1989) (describing the role of reasoned
opinions in maintaining the rule of law).
44. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective DecisionMaking, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941, 968-69 & nn.91-93 (1995) ("The written opinion increases the
prospect of decision-making on the basis of generally applicable principle and external authority
rather than on less predictable or acceptable considerations.").
45. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1794-95 ("That which is lawful is also legitimate.").
Fallon does not suggest that every wrongly decided case is illegitimate. Id. On the contrary,
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exposition of the Court's reasoning.
The professional commitments of
lawyers, lower court judges, and mainstream scholars oblige them to adopt the
Court's premise, at least in their working lives. Scholarly analysis and criticism
of Supreme Court opinions concentrates on whether and how skillfully the
Court has pursued and achieved these aims.47 Otherwise, no one would take
the opinions seriously, briefs could not credibly cite them as authority, lower
court judges would lack guidance, and doctrinal scholarship would be
useless.
49
48
Gaps and flaws are presumed to be the product of analytical error, hurry,
more or less isolated instances of duplicity, 50 or the exigencies of the need for
compromise among Justices who agree on the result but differ as to the
reasons. 5' Debate about whether a given Supreme Court opinion falls short is
itself one of the central themes in legal scholarship.
Understanding the judicial opinion as an exercise in legal legitimacy
provides standards for critique and guidance that serve us well for most
"[a] charge of illegitimacy typically implies a strong condemnation not warranted by all legal
errors." Id.at 1794.
46. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of JudicialCandor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 737
(1987) ("A requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions-grounds of decision that
can be debated, attacked, and defended-serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary's
exercise of power.").
47. See Fallon, supra note 43, at 30 (noting that "Legal Process accounts [of the Rule of
Law] maintain that a reasoned connection between recognized legal norms and sources of
authority and the outcome in particular cases often will satisfy the requirements of the Rule of
Law"). Fallon further observes that "[iun contemporary constitutional law, the influence of the
Legal Process ideal type is enormous, if not pervasive ....[C]ountless arguments and opinions
presuppose Legal Process premises, even if they do not pause to defend their presuppositions."
Id. at 31.
48. See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
49. See Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chartof
the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84,84 (1959) (acknowledging the temporal demands placed on
Supreme Court Justices).
50. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, 174 (2001) (asserting that the ruling in Bush v. Gore "may be ranked
as the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history").
51. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court,95 HARV. L. REv. 802,
811-31 (1982) (arguing that inconsistent decisions are often the result of the compromises
necessary to produce majority opinions on a multi-member Supreme Court); Friedman, supra
note 8, at 280-86 (discussing the political science literature documenting the proposition that
"[w]hen it comes to the written opinion, collegial pressures almost certainly temper what judges
can do").
The independent significance of this theme may be limited. To the extent these pressures
are themselves a product of the desire by some members of the majority to give reasons that will
win public support, the driving force behind collegial constraints seems to be sociological
legitimacy.
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purposes. The general success of our legal system in providing fair and
efficient adjudication of disputes favors retaining the traditional model. But an
inherent feature of models is that they simplify reality. No one can fully
understand every aspect of anything by sticking with a single point of view.
Like all models, the foregoing account omits some significant truths about
Supreme Court opinions. The attentive reader of opinions sometimes finds that
the reasons the Court stresses do not fully account for the outcome, and the
sense that the opinion does not tell the whole story is strongest in hard cases
with persuasive arguments on both sides.
1. The External Perspective
Much legal scholarship, "characterized by an identification of the scholar
with the judge, by an internal perspective on the role of the judiciary, and by a
consequent reluctance to see judges as (even partly) self-interested and
potentially ambitious political actors,0 2 takes it for granted that what Justices
do, or at least what they ought to do, is to strive for legal legitimacy, both in the
outcomes they reach and the reasons they give. 53 This body of scholarship
idealizes the Justices, treating them as "oracles of the law" 54 who grapple with
the legal materials in the quest for the right outcomes and the right reasons,
though often going wrong.5 5 Despite the prevalence of this view, there are
good reasons to believe that the Court will more likely than not resolve
conflicts between sociological and legal legitimacy in favor of the former.
Some of the truth about a practice is hard to perceive when one always
experiences it from the inside. 56 One of the reasons we idealize judges is that,
working within the legal system, we adopt its norms as our own. If we put
52. Schauer, supra note 42, at 616.
53. Of course, legal and moral legitimacy may point in different directions, raising the
question of what circumstances justify sacrificing one for the other. See, e.g., ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 197 (1975) (characterizing
the issue in the slavery context as "whether the moral values served by antislavery...
outweighed interests and values served by fidelity to the formal system").
54. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW xi (1968) (borrowing the phrase from
Blackstone).
55. See Posner, supranote 1, at 33-34 (describing the internal perspective of traditional
doctrinal scholarship); see also id. at 49 (noting that there are "many examples of the Justices'
voting against the grain-more precisely, voting for results that they would not favor if they
were legislators or other policymakers, and in that role were unconstrained by political
considerations").
56. See Posner, supra note 1, at 32-34 (distinguishing between the aspects of the legal
system that can be appreciated by way of an external perspective and an internal perspective).
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aside the presuppositions of actors within the legal system, judges appear in a
different and less flattering light. When the judicial process is examined from
an external perspective, it appears more plausible, indeed likely, that the
Justices strive more for sociological than legal legitimacy.
Viewed from outside the system, the Justice does not at all resemble an
oracle. He is a human being clothed with the authority of the state, making
decisions about conflicts over the distribution of social benefits and burdens,
like many other officials. Accordingly, one may better understand the opinionwriting choices the Justices make by beginning from the premise that they
behave like human beings obliged to choose between competing goals, 57 faced
with a demanding set of requirements they cannot always meet without
sometimes cutting corners.5 The Justices will bring to this task not only their
professional commitments as leaders of the judicial system, but all their human
qualities, including their interest in maintaining their authority and enhancing
their reputations. 59 If they are like other ambitious human beings, they crave
public approbation and a favorable place in the history books. Their nightmare
is that they may be lumped together with the "Four Horsemen" who, during the
Great Depression, blocked government programs aimed at economic recovery,
and who were ultimately repudiated. 60 No one wants to be remembered as
57. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 39 (1994) ("Judges are rational, and they
pursue instrumental and consumption goals of the same general kind and in the same general
way that private persons do.").
58. In this respect, this Article is in the tradition of Legal Realism, with its insistence on
treating the judge as a human being, subject to all the influences that bear on decision making
by human beings in everyday life. See Schauer, supra note 42, at 617-18 (noting the
importance of studying the "self-interested motivations" of judges).
At the same time, there is an important sense in which this Article is not Realist. While the
"core claim" of Realism is that "judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts," Brian Leiter,
Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a NaturalizedJurisprudence,76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275
(1997), I assume that the Court's holdings can be justified by reference to legal materials. I
distinguish between the reasoning that may have produced the outcome and the reasoning that
appears in the opinions, and direct my attention solely to the content of the opinions. At the
same time, my thesis is compatible with Realism, as none of my conclusions turn on whether
results can be grounded in legal materials.
59. See Schauer, supra note 42, at 625-26 (arguing that reputation is an important
motivation for Supreme Court Justices); id. at 629 (noting that, as a consequence, the Justices
may "seek to conform their behavior to the demands of the relevant esteem-granting (or
withholding) or reputation-creating (or damaging) groups").
60. See ROBERT G. MCCLoSKEY, TiE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 117-20 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing how President Roosevelt's court-packing plan of 1937 caused a crisis for the Court);
KATHLEEN M. SuLLVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134-47,500-07 (15th ed.
2004) (describing the heightened judicial scrutiny of economic regulations from the Lochner era
through the New Deal).
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having been "callously indifferent to the commonweal,"'', as those Justices were
(fairly or unfairly) characterized by their critics.
2. Costs, Benefits, and JudicialIncentives
When the demands of sociological legitimacy clash with legal legitimacy,
the Justices may be forced to choose between them in selecting reasons for
inclusion in the opinion. One line of reasoning will better satisfy the demands
of fidelity to law, while another provides the public with a rationale it prefers.
Faced with a conflict between legal and sociological legitimacy, the Court has
to decide which to sacrifice or subordinate. If the Justices are rational and selfinterested, the choice will depend on an assessment of the costs and benefits of
each alternative. The practical benefits of enhanced legitimacy-whether it is
achieved by way of giving the true reasons for outcomes or giving false onesinclude greater judicial effectiveness due to less resistance to the Court's
rulings, as well as greater prestige for the Justices.
Now compare the two routes to this goal. Sociological legitimacy aims
directly at public acceptance and its benefits can be grasped in the short term.
Critics may take issue with one's reasoning, but so long as the reasons given are
plausible the critique can do little damage to the Court's standing.6 2 By
contrast, legal legitimacy has only an attenuated bearing on whether and how
quickly the ruling will win public support. Justices who meet its criteria cannot
be as confident that they will win public acceptance. For example, the Justices
who relied on Lochner v. New York 63 to thwart New Deal reforms in the early

61. Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REv. 559, 559
(1997). Professor Cushman goes on to argue that the reputation is undeserved: "The Four
Horsemen were themselves closet liberals. It appears that they struck a reactionary pose in
celebrated cases in order to retain the good graces of the conservative sponsors to whom they
owed their positions and whose social amenities they continued to enjoy." Id. at 560-61.
Cushman's thesis highlights one of the challenges that confront a Justice concerned about what
others think. The impression that wins favor today may subject one to obloquy in the future,
simply because intellectual fashions change.
62. See Friedman, supranote 8, at 325-28 (noting that the Court "maintain[s] a reservoir
of popular favor even among those who dislike [its] immediate decisions").
63. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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1930s had plenty of authority to back them up. 64 Nonetheless, the public
rejected their rulings, both as to results and reasoning. 65
In addition, a sound cost-benefit equation must take account of the
likelihood of success at achieving the goal for which one aims. Sociological
legitimacy is ordinarily an attainable goal, as ascertaining the relevant public
attitudes is usually a manageable task. However much one strives for legal
legitimacy, one can never be confident of success. Hard cases, with plausible
arguments on both sides, are the ones most likely to give rise to conflict
between legal and sociological legitimacy.66 No matter what line of reasoning
the Court chooses, there will be room for dispute as to whether the legal
materials support the outcome. The problem is that the Justices must defend
their outcomes in a world of sharp disagreement as to both substance and
methodology, as the legal elites who make judgments about legal legitimacy
differ among themselves about what counts as a good legal argument. Granting
that in Fallon's scheme judges can achieve legal legitimacy without necessarily
being right,67 a risk-averse Justice can never be certain that critics will be
generous in appraising perceived errors. A sincere Justice, sacrificing popular
acclaim for the sake of articulating the legally correct argument, may find that
he has erred on the law and end by losing both legal and sociological
legitimacy.6 8
64. See Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 692-94 (2005) ("[T]he Supreme Court was duty bound to
defend the old order until a constitutional moment changed the foundations of the American
constitutional system.").
65. See McCLOSKEY, supra note 60, at 117 (describing "the constitutional revolution of
1937").
66. See RONALD DwORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) (describing the
characteristics of a hard case).
67. See Fallon, supranote 10, at 1817-18 ("[W]e can say that a legal decision was legally
legitimate... even though we disagree with it.").
68. The premise underlying the reasoning in this paragraph is that legal legitimacy does
not depend on what anybody in the audience thinks. Everyone may think the decision meets the
test of legal legitimacy, and yet be wrong, or vice versa. This is my understanding of Fallon's
concept of legal legitimacy. The alternative is to suppose that legal legitimacy does depend on
how the "interpretive community" evaluates a ruling. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN
THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 303-22 (1980) (arguing that
"meanings are the property neither of fixed and stable texts nor of free and independent readers
but of interpretive communities that are responsible both for the shape of a reader's activities
and for the texts those activities produce"). In that event, the "legal" legitimacy of a ruling
seems to depend on whether a certain segment of the audience-members of the legal elite,
probably-thinks it can arguably be justified by the legal materials, not on whether its reasoning
is faithful to the legal materials. If this were so, it would follow that legal legitimacy does not
compete with, but instead collapses into, sociological legitimacy. Since its existence would
depend on whether a particular, albeit rather narrow, audience approves of the Court's
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Furthermore, over time the Justice who wins sociological legitimacy can
usually be confident of procuring legal legitimacy in the long run as well, for
69
general public acceptance of a principle eventually produces legal legitimacy.
Thus, the winning side in the constitutional revolution of the late 1930s
overturned fundamental constitutional principles and overruled many
precedents. Both their reasoning and their results may have lacked legal
legitimacy in the short term. Yet today, virtually no one questions the legal
legitimacy of the new regime.70 On the other hand, legal legitimacy does not
produce sociological legitimacy, as the Justices who lost the constitutional
battle of the 1930s learned to their chagrin. 7' To a pragmatic, self-interested
Justice, the choice is clear. The cost-benefit calculation persistently favors the
sociological version of legitimacy over the legal variety.72 Nor is this calculus
limited to the self-aggrandizing, power-seeking Justice. An astute Justice who
puts legal legitimacy at the core of the judicial process will appreciate the need
for the Court to pay attention to public attitudes in order to accomplish anything
of value. Only a renegade-perhaps Justice Douglas is the best example-will
ignore the requirements of sociological legitimacy.
The Justices would surely deny that they deliberately choose false reasons
for the sake of obtaining public approval.73 But another characteristic ofhuman
performance, the choice the Court would face is not between legal and sociological legitimacy
but between different versions of sociological legitimacy.
69. See Fallon, supranote 10, at 1823-24 (noting that judicial precedent can attain legal
legitimacy "because it is viewed as legally valid among judges and lawyers and is at least
acquiesced in by enough of the rest of the citizenry").
70. A judge who, intent on fidelity to legal legitimacy, pays no attention to anyone else,
runs the risk of becoming isolated and ineffectual. Holmes, with his bold dissents on
substantive due process and free speech, took that chance and ultimately prevailed. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES xii-xiii (Richard A. Posner, ed. 1992) (noting that
Holmes's dissenting positions on freedom of speech and substantive due process were
ultimately adopted by the Court). Justice William 0. Douglas may have remained true to his
own views of constitutional law, but he is not remembered as an influential voice on the Court.
See Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24,2003, at 27 (reviewing BRUCE
ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (2003)).
71. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reaction to the
Court-Packing Plan of 1937).
72. See, e.g., Friedman,supranote 8, at 320-24 & nn.351, 358 & 372 (citing concerns by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy on the need to pay attention to public attitudes).
73. For some anecdotal evidence that public perceptions do influence their behavior, see
generally BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). E.g., id. at 122
(noting Chief Justice Burger's determination to vote one way rather than another in order to
improve his image); id.at 169 (noting Justice Douglas's view that "Stewart was more concerned
with the appearance of hisjurisprudence than with its substance"); id. at 186 (describing Justice
Blackmun's effort to draft the Roe opinion so as to obtain "more votes, which could mean wider
public acceptance"); id. at 188 (noting some Justices' concern that Justice Douglas might
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decisionmaking is at play. Judges, like everyone else, are prone to engage in
self-deception in order to cope with truths that would damage their self
esteem.74 Faced with unpalatable alternatives, they diminish the cognitive
dissonance by convincing themselves that the choices they make satisfy all of
the conflicting values at play. For most Justices, the way out of the
legal/sociological legitimacy dilemma is to offer reasons that are both
sufficiently plausible to satisfy their own psychological need to believe they are
striving for legal legitimacy and sufficiently widely held to meet the concerns of
sociological legitimacy. In this way, they avoid facing the uncomfortable fact
that sociological legitimacy has triumphed. Nonetheless, reasons that are
plausible may not be the reasons that do the work of deciding the case, and
fidelity to the ideal of legal legitimacy demands the latter.
My argument is not that sociological legitimacy is a kind of trump card
that always wins. Rather, I maintain that there is a systematic bias in favor of
sociological legitimacy in the hard cases that make up a significant part of the
Supreme Court's docket, not that it will prevail in every case. Suppose that in a
given case the perceived gain from putting forth reasons that aim for
sociological legitimacy is slight, because the decision will be endorsed by most
people no matter what the reasoning. At the same time, one set of reasons is
plainly superior from the perspective of legal legitimacy. In such a case, the
balance of costs and benefits would favor opting for legal legitimacy. These
are the "easy cases" that make up most of the decisions of most courts most of
the time.75

commit "a form of treason" by "making public the Court's inner machinations," since the
Court's "strength derived from the public belief that the Court was trustworthy, a nonpolitical
deliberative body"); id at 234 (noting Stewart's belief that "Blackmun was hesitant to admit"
the substantive due process basis of Roe); id. at 345 (noting Brennan's view of the need for
unanimity in the Nixon tapes case). See also Friedman, supra note 8, at 321 & n.358
(discussing Justice O'Connor's sensitivity to public attitudes).
Apart from evidence of particular Justices' sensitivity to what people think, there is a large
body of work by political scientists documenting the Court's sensitivity to public opinion. See
Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606-08 &
nn.29-36 (2003) (reviewing the literature).
74.

See DANIEL GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS:

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-

DECEPTION 21 (1985) (discussing "the trade-off of a distorted awareness for a sense of
security"); DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRuTH 87 (1993) ("We cannot just live; we must
live worthily if we can, and seem to do so even if we can't always.").
75. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 399, 414 (1985) (defining
"easy cases" as those disputes "inwhich the legal results are commonly considered obvious").
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3. A ComparativePerspective

By allowing us to step outside our system and compare it with others, the
external perspective on judging yields another argument for the primacy of
sociological legitimacy in Supreme Court opinion writing. Judges, lawyers,
and scholars working within the American legal system, educated in the notion
that the Constitution and the Rule of Law are sacred,76 resist the notion that
sociological legitimacy could appropriately override its legal and moral
dimensions. Sacrificing fidelity to law and justice for the sake of public
approval seems to threaten our core values. 7 Standing outside our system
permits one to see that this is not so. An agreeable way of life, a high standard
of living, a sophisticated legal system, a set of safeguards against abuse of state
power, and a substantial individual liberty do not depend on judicial opinions
that give priority to legal legitimacy. These qualities can accompany a judicial
system in which the opinions hardly ever give an adequate account of the
reasons behind the ruling. In France, for example, judicial decisions are
justified by one sentence "arrets" (as they are called), in the form of deductive
arguments, tersely stating the legal texts bearing on the outcome and the
judges' conclusions as to their relevance to the case at hand.78 The demands of
legal legitimacy are not ignored. Far more elaborate justifications are prepared
internally, but these are not published. 79 The main explanation for the gap
between the rationale presented to the public and the genuine grounds is that,
for historical reasons, the French audience conceives of law in highly positivist
terms, as a realm of rules that leaves little room for judicial discretion or
reasoning. 80 Accordingly, that audience expects an opinion couched in rulelike terms and, following the norms of sociological legitimacy, French courts
honor that preference. Whatever the merits of French judicial form, its very
existence challenges the notion that establishing the legal legitimacy of the

76.

See PAULW. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW 1-4 (1997) (describing America's "faith in the

rule of law").
77. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 101 (1990) ("[I]t is...
essential to any legal system worthy of respect that it invite the use of mind and judgment in its
readers, that it create an occasion for a certain sort of wholeness of thought that does not

otherwise exist.").
78. See Michael Wells, FrenchandAmericanJudicialOpinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L. L. 81,
92-99 (1994) (describing the characteristics of French judicial opinions).
79. See Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Judicial(Self-) Portraits:JudicialDiscoursein the
French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1355-58 (1995) (describing the "unofficial
discourse" that arises between judges and their colleagues regarding the merits of cases).
80. See Wells, supranote 78, at 104-06 (explaining why positivist influences stemming
from the French Revolution still impact modem French judicial opinion writing).
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outcome is the natural and inevitable aim of ajudicial opinion. Indeed, French
practice belies the notion that well-reasoned opinions are in some sense
necessary, and compels one to consider the choices judges must make about the
type of legitimacy to pursue in the crafting of opinions.8'
From the perspective of an insider, French judicial opinions are
satisfactory.82 Only an outsider, familiar with other ways of justifying
outcomes, can fully appreciate their drawbacks. The same is true of American
opinions. Working with them from the beginning of law school, many
American lawyers and legal scholars come to take it for granted that the reasons
set forth are presumptively authentic. They must believe this in order to work
with the opinions, or else risk succumbing to corrosive cynicism. For
Americans, flaws in the reasoning indicate either that the judge has committed
an error or that he has ignored his obligation to be candid. From an external
perspective, the striking feature of the Supreme Court's opinions is the sheer
number of instances in which they, at least arguably, fail to satisfy the
requirements of legal legitimacy. Lack of competence is hardly a plausible
explanation. It is belied by the Justices' professional qualifications, and by
their access to brilliant law clerks and other resources. And it cannot account
for the typical pattern of opinion writing, in which a Justice whose analytical
skills seem woefully lacking when he writes a majority opinion regains stature
when in dissent. In any domain, persistent failure to meet a standard is
evidence that the point of the enterprise lies elsewhere. For example, low
graduation rates for some top-ranked Division I-A college football teams
suggest that graduating from college is not the point of the players' presence
there.83 In the same way, the chronic problems with Supreme Court opinions
81. The form of both French and American judicial decisions-and the continuing
allegiance of each of these legal cultures to opinions that are not particularly functionalillustrates Erving Goffman's insight that "a given social front tends to become institutionalized
in terms of the abstract stereotyped expectations to which it gives rise, and tends to take on a
meaning and stability apart from the specific tasks which happen at the time to be performed in
its name." GOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 27.
82. See Wells, supra note 78, at 102 (noting support for the "syllogistic fagade of the
French opinion" in French academia).
83. See, e.g., College Football Study Provides a Reality Check on Academic
Performance, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 27, 2006, at A12 (noting that in a study of
graduation rates for schools competing in bowl games, "[n]ational championship contender
Ohio State ranked next to last, graduating 32 percent of black players, outranking only Georgia
(24 percent)"); Almost Halfof Bowl Teams FallingShort in Classroom,HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 6, 2005, at C4 ("Forty-one percent of this year's bowl-bound teams fall below the NCAA's
new academic benchmark, and almost half lack a 50 percent graduation rate, according to an
annual study."); see also Ray Melick, APR Progress: Academic Focus or Hocus-pocus?,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 3, 2007, at lB (arguing that NCAA figures on graduation rates cannot
be trusted, because the NCAA "has to trust the numbers provided by schools that are secretive
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provide support for the thesis that the Justices are pursuing some other agenda
besides legal legitimacy.
C. Sociological Versus Moral Legitimacy
While few of the issues addressed year-in and year-out by the Court
concern choices between morally legitimate and illegitimate alternatives, the
Court does sometimes encounter conflicts between sociological legitimacy and
moral legitimacy. At the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,84 for example, it was no
less morally illegitimate for the Court to enforce racial segregation than it was
fifty years later when Brown v. Board of Education85 overturned Plessy. Yet
Plessy "caused scarcely a ripple when it was announced on May 18, 1896. '' 86
However much one would like to think that the Court will put moral over
sociological legitimacy, our history suggests otherwise. The NAACP
understood as much when it laid the foundations for attacking Plessy. Rather
than a head-on assault on the moral (or legal) grounds for that case, it
undertook an extensive litigation strategy, beginning with comparatively easy
cases-like that of segregation in graduate school admissions where no
alternative was available-and gradually worked its way up to harder ones like
the separate-but-equal doctrine as applied in the public schools. Besides
shifting the legal framework, proceeding in this way helped to change public
attitudes, so that the moral and legal case against separate-but-equal would have
a better chance to prevail.87 Combined with other changes in society during
and after World War II, Brown became "a realistic judicial possibility in
'
1954.088
The truth the NAACP grasped is that no matter how strong one's
moral and legal arguments, without sufficient public support, an effort to

in matters of academic integrity when it comes to athletes and that have compelling reasons to
report high graduation rates and good APR numbers to justify the huge investment made in
college football and basketball").
84. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (upholding racial segregation in
public accommodations under the "separate but equal" doctrine).
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86.

HARVEY FIRESIDE, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:

HOMER PLESSY AND THE SUPREME

COURT DECISION THAT LEGALIZED RACISM 222 (2004). Though the ruling did not produce a
groundswell of moral revulsion, reactions were mixed. Fireside notes that southerners and
at 223Democrats tended to hail the decision while Republicans and blacks deplored it. See id.
28 (gauging the public's reaction to the decision through newspaper accounts).
87. See generallyMARK TUSHNET, THENAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED

1925-1950 (1987).
P. BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONsTrtmONALDECISIONMAKING 739 (4th ed. 2000).

EDUCATION,

88.
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vindicate them might nonetheless fail. Rightly or wrongly, as a descriptive
matter, sociological legitimacy is often a key consideration.
In any event, when conflicts between moral and sociological legitimacy
arise, the problem invariably concerns the outcome more than the reasoning of
the opinion. Thus, the topic I am concerned with in this Article-namely, the
choices the Court makes in writing opinions-is one as to which conflicts
between moral and sociological legitimacy have little bearing. Plessy is
condemned and Brown applauded on moral grounds because of their holdings,
not the Court's reasoning. DredScott v. Sandford,8 9 defending slavery, would
have been morally repugnant no matter what the reasoning. Whether the
Court's abortion decisions are morally compelled, morally neutral, or morally
abhorrent has little to do with their craftsmanship.
III. Appearance Management in Supreme Court Opinions
One way for the Court to strive for sociological legitimacy is to focus on
results, by generating holdings that accord with widespread public preferences,
or at least elite preferences. 90 The "positive" political science literature on the
Supreme Court yields considerable evidence that the Court is, over time,
sensitive to popular views in adjudicating constitutional issues. 9 1 The Court's
abrupt change of direction in the late 1930s is an especially vivid example of a
broader tendency. But this is only part of the story of how the Court defers to
public attitudes. The political science literature focuses too narrowly on
outcomes, and pays little attention to the reasons the Justices offer.
This distinction between reasoning and results may seem counter-intuitive.
Common sense suggests that the broad public is concerned almost exclusively
with outcomes, and pays little attention to judicial reasoning. But the general
89. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529 (1856) (holding that slaves
or persons of African descent are not citizens of the United States).
90. See Schauer, supra note 42, at 629 (suggesting that there may be "some reference
groups that even life-tenured and highly prominent Supreme Court Justices desire to appeal to
in a more or less conscious way"); see also Neal Devins, ExplainingGrutter v. Bollinger, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 347, 347-48, 350-62 (2003) (arguing that the outcome in Grutterand other cases
reflect this theme). Another is for the Justices to strive for consensus, present a united front and
discourage dissents, as the Court did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See
Friedman, supra note 8, at 288-89 (describing "this early norm of consensus and its collapse in
the twentieth century").
91. See Friedman, supra note 73, at 2598 (noting that his project is to describe "research
in the social sciences that suggests there is substantial congruity between popular opinion and
the decisions of constitutional judges"); Friedman, supra note 8, at 322-23 (citing studies by
political scientists exploring the connection between judicial decisions and popular opinion).
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public is perhaps the least important part of the immediate audience forjudicial
decisions. A more important segment of that audience, and one that will
ultimately influence public attitudes as well, consists of dissenting Justices,
opinion leaders, and constitutional theorists. These elites do pay attention to
reasons as well as results. Their reactions to the Court's work will, in turn,
have a significant bearing on the attitudes of the public at large. Appeals to
(the majority's understanding of) legally legitimate reasons for outcomes may
not suffice, as these legal elites disagree sharply among themselves as to what
methods of constitutional interpretation are legally legitimate, even when they
more or less agree on the legitimacy of a given outcome. They devote
considerable attention to knocking down, defending, and rehabilitating the
Court's reasoning.9 2 There are partisans on either side of such questions as
how much weight should be accorded the constitutional text, the specific
purposes of the framers, precedent, evolving standards over time, current costs
and benefits, and other methods of constitutional interpretation.93
In this environment, a strategy of accommodation to popular preferences
will likely fail if it is limited to decisions about who wins and loses. Often, as
in Bush v. Gore,94 the outcome will give rise to controversy no matter which
side the Court takes. Outcomes that meet with popular approval, as the curbs
on habeas signaled by Teague v. Lane95 surely would, still must be reconciled
with legal materials that seem to favor a different result. Even where a
comparatively safe resolution of the merits is available, as it was in Brown v.
Boardof Education,96 the Court may conclude that the substantive merits of a
bolder holding are worth bearing the costs of controversy. In all of these cases,
the Court cannot count on procuring sociological legitimacy by virtue of its
substantive holding alone. It must instead turn to the reasoning of the opinion
as a means of gaining acceptance, or at least minimizing the intensity of
92.

See generally WHAT

ROE v. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID:

EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION

THE NATION'S

ToP

LEGAL

(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005)

(collecting suggestions by scholars for improving the opinion); WHAT

BROWN v. BOARD OF

EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (similar).

93. See Matthew D. Adler, PopularConstitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose PracticesGroundUS. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 719,747 (2006) (arguing that "[t]here
is no single, canonical recognitional community for U.S. law").
94. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
95. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (prohibiting the retroactive application
of most new rules of criminal procedure in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
96. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For example, the Court might have
retained the "separate but equal doctrine" and ruled that the legality of school segregation would
turn on whether, in a given school district, the factual record supported the plaintiffs' claim.
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disagreement. 97 Even if critics cannot be convinced of the rightness of a given
outcome, inoffensive reasoning can mute their objections, assure their "diffuse
support" of the Court,98 and thereby maintain sociological legitimacy at least in
the "weak" sense. 99
So it is the quest for sociological legitimacy that pervades the reasongiving stage of adjudication. Though no one questions the legal legitimacy of
Brown, for example, the social science evidence the Court relied on seems
better understood as an effort to maximize public acceptance than as a
forthright account of the constitutional principles underlying the holding.
Because sociological legitimacy figures in the Court's strategies ofjustification,
we can better understand the Court as an institution and can better appraise the
doctrine it generates by setting aside the traditional legal legitimacy model, if
only for the purposes of inquiry, and paying attention to the influence of
sociological legitimacy on the content of its opinions. This Part of the Article
describes how the Court caters to its audience's expectations in its choice of
reasons, and identifies some of the main tools it uses to manage appearances.
Sociological legitimacy turns on whether "the relevant public regards [a
decision] as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support," or at
least acquiesces in it.100 In order to achieve this goal, the Court must pay
97. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1826, 1828-29 (associating sociological legitimacy
primarily with public attitudes toward substantive outcomes, and discussing the Court's
reasoning as an aspect of legal legitimacy). This account of the elements of sociological
legitimacy seems unduly restrictive. Whether the general public follows the nuances of the
Court's reasoning or not, the elite groups who shape public opinion base their views of the
Court on the Court's methodology as well as on the substantive rules it hands down.
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to treat the Court's reasoning as part of its strategy for
enhancing its sociological legitimacy. In at least one instance, Fallon seems to take this view.
See id. at 1836 (defending the Court's less-than-candid reasoning in Boiling v. Sharpe on the
ground that candor "might have precipitated a sociological legitimacy crisis").
For his basic position that sociological legitimacy is a product of outcomes, Fallon relies
on Michael J. Klarman's article. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1829 n. 185 (citing Michael J.
Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of ConstitutionalHistory, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721
(2001)). Indeed, Klarman begins by declaring that "history's verdict on a Supreme Court ruling
depends more on whether public opinion ultimately supports the outcome than on the quality of
the legal reasoning or the craftsmanship of the opinion." Klarman, supra at 1722. Yet, as
Klarman acknowledges, "[t]he Justices themselves.., seem convinced of the opposite view:
that the Court's legitimacy depends on its ability to convince observers that its rulings are based
on sound legal principle, rather than political calculation or personal preference." Id. at 1723.
There is no real conflict between Klarman's view and the one he attributes (correctly, I think) to
the Court. Given a controversial substantive result, the reasoning of the opinion is the Court's
means of trying to win public support.
98. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1828 n.180.
99. Id. at 1796.
100. Id. at 1795-96.
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attention to the impressions that its opinions engender in its audience, including
the legal elites who pay attention to reasons. Consequently, the reasons set
forth most prominently in the opinions may differ from the ones that weigh
most heavily in resolving the case. Because the true reasons may be suppressed
or minimized, legal legitimacy will sometimes be sacrificed for the sake of the
sociological version.
The underlying point here is that the Supreme Court is not just a court and
not just the head of the judicial branch of government. It is also an actor in
society, and its stature depends, like that of any social actor, on how well it gets
along with others. Sociologist Erving Goffman's study of social interaction
furnishes a helpful analogy for understanding the Court's appearance
management strategy.°10' Goffman observes that the individual, in his dealings
with others, seeks to influence their impressions of him so that they will think
well of him and give him what he wants.10 2 For this reason, people nearly
always pay attention to the image they project. 10 3 The same is true of groups,
or, in Goffman's terminology, "teams" who work together, like the staff of a
hotel, toward a common appearance management goal.1°4 Goffman's
perspective on social behavior merits attention for what it can teach us about

101.

See generally ERVING

GOFFMAN, THE GOFFMAN READER

(Charles Lemert & Ann

Branaman eds., 1997) (collecting Goffman's writings on social theory); GOFFMAN, supra note
13 and accompanying text (discussing Goffinan's theory on social interaction).
102. See GOFEmAN, supra note 13, at 4 (suggesting that one accomplishes this goal "by
expressing himself in such way as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act
voluntarily in accordance with his own plan").
103. See id. at 4 ("[W]hen an individual appears in the presence of others, there will
usually be some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that it will convey an impression to
others which it is in his interests to convey.").
104. See id. at 77-105 (noting that, in the group context, appearance management "serves
mainly to express the characteristics of the task that is performed and not the characteristics of
the performer"). While most of the Justices see themselves as a team working together to
manage public impressions, there may be renegades who insist on pursuing more personal goals,
to the chagrin of their colleagues. Justice William 0. Douglas may be the best modem example.
See, e.g., RICHARD N. GOODWIN, REMEMBERING AMERICA 28-29 (1988) (describing Justice
Frankfurter's view that Justice Douglas was selfish and irresponsible); WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 73, at 189 (1979) (describing Justice Brennan's view that, by 1972,
"Douglas had become an intellectually lazy, petulant, prodigal child"). See also James Ryerson,
DirtyRotten Hero, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at 19 (reviewing BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD
BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (2003)). Drawing on details documented
in the book, Ryerson asserts that Justice Douglas "lied about everything..., flagrantly, easily
and in the service of his own rags-to-riches legend," and that Douglas could be "a rotten and
unscrupulous person." Id. Despite Murphy's sympathetic portrayal of Douglas as a Justice,
Ryerson finds it "hard to avoid the impression that Douglas was, on the Court as well as off, a
showboat and a troublemaker, and-as his nickname suggests-too wild for his own good." Id.
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the Court, because the Court resembles any other group of persons pursuing
their interests through a collaborative effort.
Like any other group, the Court has goals and would prefer to be more
rather than less effective in realizing them. Prominent among its goals is public
acceptance of a strong role for the Court in governance. With this aim in mind,
the Justices find it highly useful, if not essential, to influence the impressions
others have of them. By managing appearances in this way, the Court hopes to
achieve the sociological legitimacy it craves. Just as any of us in our daily lives
will try to control the impressions others have of us in order to win the
confidence of our various audiences, so also do the Justices. In particular, we
all strive to limit access to the "backstage" of our public lives, where "the
capacity of a performance to express something beyond itself may be
painstakingly fabricated.' 0 5 So it is with the Supreme Court. The Justices
limit public access to their work, appear before the public almost exclusively in
the highly structured settings of oral argument and the texts of opinions, and lay
down confidentiality norms to dissuade employees with access to inside
information from revealing secrets. 10 6 Notwithstanding the occasional
renegade-a prominent example is the book Closed Chambers, by former
Blackmun clerk Edward Lazarus' 0 7--the Court has, for the most part, managed
to control the image it projects. Moreover, the Justices believe the best
personal strategy is, by and
large, to create impressions that further the prestige
08
of the group as a whole.
105.

GOFFMAN,

supranote 13, at 112.

106. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 327-28 (suggesting that Court-imposed limitations on
access to information influence public attitudes). Goffinan explains:
Since the vital secrets of a show are visible backstage and since performers behave
out of character while there, it is natural to expect that the passage from the front
region to the back region will be kept closed to members of the audience or that the
entire back region will be kept hidden from them.
GOFFMAN,

107.

supra note 13, at 113.
See generally EDWARD LAZARUS,

OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT

CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE

(1998) (detailing the Court's internal deliberations). For an

especially harsh attack on Lazarus, see Richard W. Painter, Open Chambers?,97 MIcH. L. REv.
1430, 1434 (1999) ("[T]his review will address ethical lapses in the book that have troubled the
author of this review and others.").
108. This focus on the institution does not exclude the possibility that some of the Justices
from time to time pursue a personal strategy and an institutional one at the same time. For
example, several Justices were sources for BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN (1979), and Justice Stewart is said to have been the book's "secret instigator and
primary early source." David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 303, 304 (2001). Later, some of the same Justices complained about the book.
Compare id. at 304 (noting Justice Powell's cooperation), with id.at 310 (noting Justice
Powell's criticisms); Compare id. at 312 & n.51 (suggesting Justice Brennan's tacit cooperation
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A. The Rhetoric of Inevitability

Conceiving the Supreme Court as a social actor helps one to decode
certain otherwise puzzling features of its opinions. As Erwin Chemerinsky has
pointed out, "Opinions are written to make results seem determinate and valuefree, rather than indeterminate and value-based ... to appear consistent with
precedent, even when they are not... [and] to make decisions seem restrained,
rather than activist. ' ° 9 Among other examples, Chemerinsky cites
Brandenburgv. Ohio,' 10 a key free speech case restricting the state's power to
punish someone for advocating violence, where the per curiam opinion makes
"it seem that [the] decision [was] consistent with precedent even when it [was]
not.""' Other opinions give the impression that no value choices need to be
made. Thus, the Court's sovereign immunity cases "never acknowledge" that
they are "all about a choice between protecting government immunity or
ensuring government accountability." '" 2 A recent instance of the rhetoric of
inevitability, again from the sovereign immunity context, is Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz. 13 There, the Court held, in a 5-4 ruling, that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its
Article I bankruptcy power. 14 The holding came as a surprise to many
observers, because two other recent cases had held, again by 5-4, that Congress5
may not abrogate state immunity when acting under Article I powers.'
Admitting that neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in the earlier
cases had drawn any distinctions among Article I powers," 16 Justice Stevens'
with the authors), with id. at 312-13 (noting Justice Brennan's denial of cooperation).
109. Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 2010. See also Posner,supra note 7, at 1430 & n. 17
(discussing "rhetoric of inevitability").
110. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (limiting the
government's ability to restrict speech to that which is likely to incite imminent lawless action).
111. Chemerinsky, supranote 23, at 2016.
112. Id.at 2014.
113. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (allowing Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity through its Article I powers).
114. Id.
115. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot "subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts"); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not give
Congress the power to "grant jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued").
Justice O'Connor had voted for upholding immunity in Alden and Seminole Tribe, but joined
the dissenters in those cases to make a majority for rejecting immunity in Katz. She did not
write an opinion in Katz.
116. See Katz, 546 U.S. at 363 ("We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and
the dissenting opinions in [Seminole Tribe] reflected an assumption that the holding in that case
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opinion for the Katz majority nonetheless indicates no doubt about the
outcome, nor any sense that the outcome depends on anything other than the
distinctive history of bankruptcy. 1 7 Thus, though the Court cited no direct
evidence from that history, "[t]he ineluctable conclusion ...is that States
agreed in the plan 8 of the Convention" to give up sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy cases."
Some potential explanations for this characteristic of Supreme Court
opinions are implausible. It cannot be that results really can be derived from
the legal materials in a straightforward fashion. The Court agrees to hear only a
tiny fraction of the cases submitted to it, and it usually chooses the ones that
present the hardest problems. Most cases on the Court's docket raise tough
issues, turn on choices between conflicting social goals, and could go either
way. 19 Nor can one credibly argue that the author of the majority opinion
lacked the time or intellectual resources needed to perceive and wrestle with the
hard questions the case raised. Even if a given Justice's chambers were fairly
described as incompetent, help is available from other members of the majority.
For that matter, dissenting opinions often take pains to identify the issues the
Court has glossed over, and drafts of the dissents
are typically available to the
20
majority well in advance of publication. 1
Judicial preference for minimizing the scope of judicial creativity is a
pervasive feature of opinion-writing, at least in the modem era.' 2' The
deductive style is so ubiquitous that experienced judges, lawyers, and scholars
rarely call attention to the practice, but take it for granted as a part of the legal
would apply to the Bankruptcy Clause.").
117. Id. at 375 (noting that the history of the Bankruptcy Clause does "not contravene the
norms this Court has understood the Eleventh Amendment to exemplify").
118. Id.at377.
119. For an especially blunt statement of this point, see Posner, supra note 1,at 40
(declaring that "Almost a quarter century as a federal appellate judge has convinced me that it is
rarely possible to say with a straight face of a Supreme Court constitutional decision that it was
decided correctly or incorrectly").
120. Dissenting opinions identify chinks in the majority's armor and in this way mitigate
the aura of inevitability surrounding the majority opinion. In the ordinary case, this possibility
does not seem to trouble the majority much. There is, however, some evidence that in especially
sensitive cases where public acceptance is crucial, some Justices use the threat of a dissent as a
weapon for having their way. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 73, at 44
(recounting Justice Black's threat to dissent in a school desegregation case in which he thought
the proposed disposition insufficiently forceful); id.at 85, 187, 206-07 (reporting on instances
in which Justice Douglas used threats in this way).
121. Perhaps it is typical of every era. See S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 107 (2003) ("It is because law has to present the appearance of continuity that
change comes about behind such screens as unchanging words.").
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landscape. The Court's rhetorical stance has been described as a "convention"
of opinion-writing, and so it is. 122 But people do not adopt conventions in the
first place without some reason for doing so. Nor is a convention likely to
persist over time and in the face of changes in personnel unless it generates
some benefit. From the Court's perspective, one advantage of the rhetoric of
inevitability is that its use enables the Justices, as well as members of their
audience, to avoid psychological conflict. While a given ruling may draw harsh
criticism from dissenters and some commentators, both the Justices and their
professional audience tend to overlook, explain away, or minimize the
significance of evidence that the Court's performances may not tell the whole
story. 2 3 Richard Posner observes that "judges are not comfortable" writing
opinions that reveal doubt. 24 A likely reason for the Justices' unease is that
their commitment to the Rule of Law obliges them to write opinions that
purport to show that the law, and not the discretionary judgment of human
beings, compels the outcome.125 And the audience, like the audience for
popular fiction, movies, and television, prefers happy and harmonious endings
over uncertainty, persistent conflict, and tragic choices.
Seen in this light, the characteristics of Supreme Court opinions that
Professor Chemerinsky documents are the product of a more or less conscious
choice on the part of the Justices to rank sociological legitimacy above legal
legitimacy in constructing opinions. In hard cases, legal legitimacy demands
thorough assessment of all aspects of the issue and a candid acknowledgment of
122. See RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 17 (1961) (suggesting that
"the departure from the deductive model is effected quite unconsciously"); Nagel, supranote 7,
at 192, 195-97 (asserting that the deductive style is a "convention").
123. Lawyers preparing briefs in later cases do not call attention to the faults they perceive
in the precedents, but seek to use or distinguish them. The same is true of academic writing on
the impact of earlier cases on current issues. Cf GOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 229-32
(discussing "the tactful tendency of the audience and outsiders to act in a protective way in order
to help the performers save their own show," and attributing this tendency to, among other
things, a desire "to ingratiate themselves with the performers for purposes of exploitation").
124. Posner, supra note 7, at 1441; see also Posner, supra note 1, at 56 ("And
'comfortable' is the right word; there is a psychological need to think one is making the right
decision rather than just taking a stab in the dark.").
125. This point is one of the central themes in PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW (1997).
Kahn argues that the Rule of Law is a "myth" in which Americans repose their faith, id. at xi,
that "[t]he judge is responsible for maintaining and articulating the rule of law," id. at 116, and
that "whether we continue to believe in the rule of law is, to some degree, a function of how
well judges maintain appearances," id. at 126. The appearance of judicial discretion must be
avoided, because "[i]f the decision to impose the rule of law upon the political domain depends
upon the subjectivity of individual judges, then the distinction between the rule of law and the
rule of men collapses." Id. at 164. They are uncomfortable expressing doubt because they
understand that their social role would be undermined by doing so.
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the difficulties with the holding, in the manner of a dispassionate law firm
memo or a well-reasoned law review article. By contrast, sociological
legitimacy calls for reasons that the public can readily endorse without much
cognitive dissonance. The dissonance problem is a severe one, because
Americans expect a lot from the Court. Throughout our history, many
Americans have treated the Constitution as a quasi-religious document,"26 and
they tend to "conflate the Court and the Constitution."' 27 Americans vaguely
want the Court both to reach just outcomes and to avoid judicial activism.1 28 In
order to satisfy these somewhat contradictory expectations, the Justices try to
tamp down controversy and encourage public acceptance by making the
outcome seem ineluctable rather than problematic, no matter how close the case
may be. They do this by systematically suppressing the role of judicial
discretion in resolving the issues in favor of less controversial grounds that in
fact have little or no influence on the outcome. Citing precedent helps "to
create the impression that the Court is rule-bound rather than rudderless.' 29 It
meticulously applies multi-part tests in order to "convey[] an impression of
deliberateness.... give[] the impression of great thoroughness,. . .[and] create

126. See SANFORD LEViNSON, CONSTrrUTIONAL FArH 9-17 (1988) (exploring the views of
those who believe the Constitution is divinely inspired).
127. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CoNsTImoN IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 9 (1986).

128. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 208 (1997) (describing
the "social construction" of a judge). Kennedy states that:
Most Americans, I suppose, want the [j]udge to be... a person who does his job
with a vengeance, rendering himself thinglike or factoid, a mere transmission belt
for legal necessity. At the same time, they want to believe that law is justice, the
product of the Judge's laser intuition, with no contradiction between the two
elements.
Id.; see also Fallon, supra note 10, at 1811 (noting that "[m]any Americans experience the
Constitution as part of an integrated normative universe in which no sharp boundaries divide the
legal from the moral"); id. at 1813-14, 1827, 1828 (describing the debate over judicial power).
An indication of the joinder of the two elements is the tendency of Americans to infer that
any ruling they do not like must be the result ofjudicial activism. For example, in Kelo v. City
of New London, the Court upheld a city's condemnation of land (for resale to a private
developer) against a charge that it violated the Fifth Amendment's requirement that takings be
for "public use." Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,484 (2005). A spate of letters in
the Wall Street Journal a few days later castigated the "liberal" majority, asserted that the
holding was an "egregious example[] ofjudicial activism," and declared that the "ruling in fact
mandates the opposite of a market outcome." Letters to the Editor, A TerriblePropertyRights
Decision, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2005, at A15.
129. Posner, supra note 1, at 44. Otherwise, "the public [may] realize the epistemic
shallowness of the body of constitutional law the Supreme Court has erected upon the
defenseless text of the Constitution." Id. at 45.
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a soothing facade of facticity."' 30 The unspoken assumption behind the Court's
opinion-writing style seems to be that legitimacy is best secured by appearing to
do less rather than more,1 3 1 even at the price of issuing 32opinions that often
mislead the reader as to the true grounds for the holding.
B. Satisfying the Audience's Expectations
Anyone concerned with appearances is well-advised to pay attention to his
audience. For the sake of exploring the implications of the Court-as-socialactor model of judicial behavior, we may compare the Supreme Court with a
political candidate, a college freshman seeking entrance to a fraternity, a
restaurant, or a hotel. These participants in social life must identify the image
that will attract and hold voters, gourmands, and travelers. The Court's agenda
is no doubt less narrowly focused on personal gain than that of many other
social actors. Nonetheless, the Court faces a similar predicament. It cannot
ignore what people think, as its influence depends on public esteem. Hence, it
must determine how best to portray itself in order to buttress its standing with
the public. Because the Court writes its opinions with its audience in mind, the
content of opinions will turn on the Court's perceptions of who is in the
audience, which members of the audience are worthy of attention, and what
kinds of reasoning will appeal to them. Every citizen is, at least indirectly, a

130. Posner, supra note 7, at 1441.
131. Thus, appearance management does not imply an effort to convince people that one is
more powerful than one really is. Quite the contrary. See GOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 38
(noting that "many classes of persons have had many different reasons for exercising systematic
modesty and for underplaying any expressions of wealth, capacity, spiritual strength, or selfrespect").
132. As for the extent to which judges deliberately manipulate the materials or
unconsciously fall into accepted patterns of behavior, I find persuasive Duncan Kennedy's
account. He argues that "judges are half-conscious." KENNEDY, supra note 128, at 191. He
continues:
Judges keep the secret, even from themselves, in part because participants in legal
culture and in the general political culture want them to. Everyone wants it to be
true that it is not only possible but common for judges to judge nonideologically.
But everyone is aware of the critique, and everyone knows that the naive theory of
the rule of law is a fairy tale, and those in the know fear that the sophisticated
versions of contemporary jurisprudence aren't much better.
Id. at 192; see also Posner, supra note 1, at 52 (arguing that the Justices may believe they
conform to "the conventional law-constrained conception ofjudges," yet they are mistaken in so
thinking); id.at 56 ("[A]cknowledging to themselves [that] the political dimension of their
role... would open a psychologically disturbing gap between their official and their actual job
descriptions.").
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member of the audience to whom opinions are addressed. But most people do
not read opinions, nor even detailed accounts of the Court's reasoning. They
probably form their views of the Court's performance by relying on legal
elites-including lawyers, judges, and scholars-along with journalists,
bloggers, talk show hosts, television commentators, and other pundits.
33
Supreme Court opinions are directed primarily to these opinion leaders. 1
The Court's effort to secure public acceptance runs into problems because
the United States is a heterogeneous society. Opinion leaders disagree among
themselves about what the judiciary should do, and their disagreements are
echoed in the public at large. Accordingly, the Court faces a tougher challenge
than some other social actors. Hotels and restaurants can aim for a segment of
the market, and the freshman can hone in on one or two fraternities. The
politician will probably calculate that his chances of success are greater if he
ignores part of the electorate in order to strengthen his appeal to the rest of it. If
the Court is to maintain its status as the impartial voice of the Rule of Law, it
cannot mimic the politician. It must undertake the harder task of convincing a
broad cross section of the public that it acts legitimately in handing down
decisions, even the ones that reach especially controversial results like136those in
135
Bush v. Gore,134 Roe v. Wade, and Brown v. Boardof Education.
In pursuing this aim, the Court engages in appearance management,
generating a gap between the reasons that do the work of deciding cases and the
reasons that appear in its opinions. The array of plausible reasons that are
typically available provides the Court with opportunities to increase the chances
for winning broad acceptance for a decision, or at least to soften the opposition
from those who find fault with the substantive outcome. Though the legal
elites and other leaders that make up the bulk of the audience for opinions may
disagree among themselves as much about what interpretive techniques are
legitimate in constitutional cases as about the legitimacy of particular
substantive decisions, there is a key difference between methodological and
substantive quarrels. Unlike most disputes about substance, the disagreement
over methodology is not between mutually exclusive sets of reasons, such that
the Court must choose one to the detriment of the other. Most of the opinion
leaders who influence public views of the Court agree that certain kinds of

133. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 7, at 169 (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning
reaches only a "few elite groups").
134. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
135. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
136. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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reasoning furnish legitimate grounds for constitutional rulings, though that
consensus is coupled with controversy about other techniques.
A rough list of the chief types of constitutional arguments (one that is
sufficient for present purposes) would include: (a) textual arguments;
(b) arguments based on the intent of the framers; (c) arguments based on
precedent; and (d) arguments based on constitutional values that cannot
uncontroversially be traced to the text and intent of the framers.' 3 7 Among the
opinion leaders whom the Court seeks to influence, the degree of support for
these arguments takes the shape of a pyramid. At the base, virtually everyone
endorses arguments based on the text and the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. 138 Then the pyramid begins to narrow a bit. Nearly everyone
accepts arguments based on precedent,' 39 but more significant disputes arise
when attention turns to such matters as the level of generality at which the
framers' aims are to be assessed, 40 or to the existence of constitutional norms
137. For a more comprehensive treatment of constitutional arguments, see Fallon, supra
note 8, at 1189-91 (exploring how these arguments "fit together or weigh against each other in a
single, presumptively coherent, constitutional calculus").
138. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995) ("The dominant rhetoric of
judges, even activist judges, is originalist, for originalism is the legal profession's orthodox
mode of justification."); see also Fallon, supra note 43, at 11-14, 44 (describing "historicist"
conceptions of the Rule of Law and their critics, some of whom challenge the practicality of the
enterprise, though not its legitimacy).
139. Some of Justice Thomas's opinions suggest that he gives little weight to precedent.
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting a willingness to overturn precedent in appropriate cases);
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing against the application of existing precedent in the commercial speech
context). See also Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCaseAgainst Precedent,17 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 23, 23 (1994) (noting that "[1]egal analysis-by lawyers, courts, and academicstypically begins and ends with precedent").
140. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality) (noting
that "the Due Process Clause 'has at times been a treacherous field for this Court,' giving
'reason for concern lest the only limits to... judicial intervention become the predilections of
those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court"'). An issue in the case was how to
give content to the "liberty" guaranteed by the due process clause. Id. at 119. Starting from the
proposition that "the asserted liberty interest [must] be rooted in history and tradition," id. at
123, Justice Scalia asserted that the appropriate "level of generality" at which to assess a claim
was "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified." Id. at 127-28 n.6. By contrast, Justice Brennan argued for
treating the constitution as a "living charter," treating history as a source of general principles
rather than specific rules. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The latter view carried the day in
PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See id. at
848 ("Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of the States at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.").
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that have no obvious textual foundation. 141 Thus, "[v]alue arguments have a
profoundly ambivalent status in our constitutional practice."'142 They may prove
decisive, yet their significance
is "resisted and occasionally denied by
43
judges."1
by
and
commentators
The pervasiveness of this ranking scheme in constitutional debate can be
illustrated by the framework of constitutional interpretation outlined by Sanford
Levinson.144 He distinguishes between "catholic" and "protestant" camps in
constitutional interpretation, arguing that the latter puts more stress on the
constitutional text, while the former includes a bigger role for judicial exegesis
of the document. 145 But the two groups do not categorically disagree on
interpretive methodology, such that one must choose one interpretation to the
exclusion of the other. 146 The common ground between them is that arguments
47
drawn from the text and the intent of the framers are always welcome.
Similarly, arguments that cannot be closely tied to the Court's precedents must
surmount significant hurdles under both the catholic and protestant
approaches. 48 Given these features of the legal landscape, an advocate seeking
support for his client's position and a Justice seeking to cobble together a
majority will be inclined to favor base-of-the-pyramid reasoning that will attract

141. Compare Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703,706 (1975) (arguing for an "acceptance ofthe courts' additional role as the expounder
of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these
ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution"), with Hans A.
Linde, Judges, Critics,and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227,254 (1972) (suggesting that
constitutional interpretation, even of an opaque text like that of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"necessarily attributes the asserted principle to the political act of adopting that text").
142. Fallon, supranote 8, at 1264.
143. Id.
144. See LEVINSON, supra note 126, at 27-30 (proffering "religious analogies for
understanding the role of the Constitution").
145. Id. at 27.
146. See id. at 29 (noting that "a significant number of constitutional debates can be
organized" under a combination of both interpretive views).
147. Similarly, Akhil Amar and his critics agree that the text and structure ought to weigh
heavily in constitutional interpretation and disagree about where to go from there. Compare
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (the fact that "various
words and phrases recur in the document... gives interpreters yet another set of clues as they
search for constitutional meaning and gives rise to yet another rich technique of constitutional
interpretation"), with Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert,andAmar: The
Trouble With Intratextualism, 113 HARv. L. REV. 730, 760 & n.159 (2000) (advancing
objections to Amar's interpretive technique).
148. See LEVINSON, supra note 126, at 27-29 ("Any discussion of methods of
constitutional interpretation carries with it a threat of political instability.").
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support from both camps rather than more cogent, but more controversial,
arguments.
Given the nature and scope of the disagreement among opinion leaders
over appropriate grounds for constitutional rulings, a core theme in the Court's
strategy for winning sociological legitimacy is to systematically favor reasons
that, at least in the abstract, enjoy broad support, calculating that general assent
to its methodology will weigh more heavily in public perception than doubts
about the reasoning of a given case. Arguments drawn from near the base of
the pyramid, including text, history, and precedent, will be systematically
favored over those that are more controversial. The Court highlights them even
though they are virtually always equivocal in the hard cases. By contrast, the
principle that drives the outcome is typically one chosen by the Justices from
among competing values. In Brown v. Board of Education149 it was that
invidious distinctions based on race violate equal protection, despite precedent
and legislative history seemingly to the contrary. In Roe v. Wade 50 it was that
constitutional "liberty" includes a woman's right to control over her body,
despite majoritarian prerogatives and the absence of textual support for this
conception of liberty. In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz 5 ' it was,
at least for most of the Justices in the majority, that state sovereign immunity
ought to bow before congressional authorization of suits against states ' 52 It is,

in short, some proposition that cannot uncontroversially be derived from the
authoritative sources, for they will typically point in both directions.
53
As a matter of"legal" legitimacy, value arguments may be compelling.154
Even so, they are rarely featured prominently in Supreme Court opinions.1
149.
150.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).

151.
152.

Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
Apart from Justice O'Connor, the other members of the Katz majority had endorsed
that broader position repeatedly. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion "prevents Congress from providing a
federal forum for a broad range of actions against States"); id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting)

(finding "no bar to the exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in
providing for suits on a federal question by individuals against a State"); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "if the Court's current reasoning is

correct, the Eleventh Amendment itself was unnecessary"). Justice Stevens's opinion in Katz
suggests no reason to think that either he or any of the other members of this group have
changed their minds.
153. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 1246-47 (asserting that "moral and political values
importantly influence the perception of arguments," such as arguments from text, arguments of
historical intent, arguments of theory, and arguments from precedent); see also id.at 1244-45
(describing these other categories of constitutional argument).
154. There are, of course, exceptions. Some years after Roe, the Court in Casey bolstered
the reasoning behind the right to choose an abortion with an explicit declaration that personal
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Lacking the straightforward and indisputable links to the constitutional text,
history, and structure that sociological legitimacy demands, these arguments are
inherently more vulnerable to attack than those in the first group. Aiming for
public acceptance, the Court often prefers to subordinate them to the former set
of arguments, even when arguments in the latter group actually account for
results. Brown v. Board of Education'55 illustrates the general theme. The
Court made a bow to precedent, but could not rely heavily on earlier cases
because the one most directly on point, Plessy v. Ferguson, 56 had upheld the
separate-but-equal doctrine the Court was determined to bring down. 157 Nor
could it rest its holding on the intent-of-the-framers, for the history was at best
equivocal. 58 So it resorted to social science evidence of the psychological
impact of segregation on black children, a move that "has been the focus of
considerable controversy."' 159 Later, the Court made it clear that Brown and
other "strict scrutiny of racial classifications" cases rest on a powerful
constitutional value condemning invidious race discrimination.' 60 Yet the
Court's opinion in Brown avoids putting much weight on that value, no doubt
because, in 1954, it feared that rationale-in the still massively segregated
culture of the 1950s-would expose it to more dangerous attacks than the
narrower quasi-scientific rationale it chose. At the very least, objections based
on values could be deflected for a time. Critics of the implicit value judgment
at the heart of the opinion were obliged to challenge the science, and the
decisions of this kind, "involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992). The Court continued:
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
Id.The Court did not cite any direct authority for these propositions. See also Posner, supra
note 1, at 84 (characterizing Justice Kennedy's opinions in Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v.
Simmons as "startlingly frank appeals to moral principles that a great many Americans either
disagree with or think inapplicable to gay rights and juvenile murderers").
155. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
156. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
157. Id. at 543.
158. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489 (noting that there is "so little in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education").
159. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 678.
160. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (stressing the impermissibility of
invidious racial discrimination in striking down a statute that prohibited racial intermarriage
involving white persons).
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of the Court's rationale were hashed out in obscure scholarly
dubious merits
16 1
journals.

C. Show Horses and Work Horses
When Supreme Court opinions in hard cases are written with an eye
toward satisfying the audience's expectations, the arguments the Court deploys
can fairly be characterized as "show horses," decorating the opinions while
doing little or none of the work of deciding the case. Meanwhile, constitutional
values are the "work horses" that determine who wins and why, but get little
attention in many of the opinions. The main source of show horses is the array
of base-of-the-pyramid arguments that dominate the Court's opinions, while
constitutional values, the work horse, are accorded a subsidiary role if they are
mentioned at all. In particular, the Court's fondness for rationales emphasizing
intent-of-the-framers and precedent is far out of proportion to theirjustificatory
power. The "values" considerations that do the work of deciding the case
typically appear not as freestanding arguments, but as thumbnail summaries of
the policies behind constitutional provisions and precedents. 62 The overall
effect is to create the impression that text, intent-of-the-framers, and precedent
are determining outcomes, while the driving force is actually some
constitutional value for which the base-of-the-pyramid arguments serves as a
convenient vehicle. For the sake of avoiding confusion, let me stress the
limited nature of my objection to base-of-the-pyramid arguments. I do not
contend that such arguments are incoherent, or unsound, or unwise, or
otherwise categorically inappropriate grounds for constitutional decisions. My
161. Another feature of the Court's appearance management strategy in Brown is Chief
Justice Warren's ultimately successful effort to present a united front by securing unanimity on
the part of the Justices. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEo. L.J. 1, 34-44 (1979) (discussing
Chief Justice Warren's efforts).
162. The Court's practice is illustrated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
268 (1964), which, for the first time, held that the First Amendment limits the scope of
defamation law. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court relied on "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270. The Court located this principle in
prior cases, none of which had anything to do with free speech constraints on tort liability for
defamation, and on the early history of criminal punishment of seditious libel. Id. at 269.
Critics have pointed out that none of these sources provide persuasive support for the Court's
proposition. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 782, 787 (1986) (arguing that the decision "was influenced too heavily by the
dramatic facts of the underlying dispute").
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point is that the Court purports to place far more weight upon these types of
arguments than they will bear. Its opinions often claim that such considerations
as text, intent-of-the-framers, and precedent control outcomes, when in fact the
decisive factor is some constitutional value that is barely mentioned in the
opinion, if not wholly ignored. 163
1H
Arguments that have considerable explanatory power qualify as work
horses, while the show horses are those that seem to be advanced or ignored
depending on the outcome the Court wishes to reach. The distinction between
the two categories is rarely air tight and many lines of cases can be read in two
or more ways. 64 As a result, it is not always crystal clear whether a given
argument is a show horse or a work horse. Nonetheless, no experienced reader
of Supreme Court opinions would deny that some arguments are for show while
others do the work. Indeed, one of the aims of doctrinal scholarship is to
identify arguments that fall into one camp or the other. The doctrinal scholar
often believes that in doing so he has exposed a flaw in the opinion. Often,
however, the so-called error is really an exercise of appearance management.
IV. Normative Issues Raised by AppearanceManagement
Should the Supreme Court engage in appearance management? If so, in
what circumstances and under what constraints? For a variety of reasons, the
pluses and minuses of appearance management receive little attention in legal
literature. Despite the prominence of appearance management in Supreme
163. For an argument (backed up by an empirical study) that the Court's resort to these
techniques varies depending on doctrinal context, and is especially pronounced in jurisdictional
law, see Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation,Avoidance, andFederalJurisdiction
Opinions,46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 78 (1998).
164. For example, prior to Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court had rejected
efforts by taxpayers to challenge federal expenditures on constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 483 (1923) (upholding the standing of a taxpayer to
challenge a congressional expenditure for aid to religious schools as a violation of the
Establishment Clause). In Flast,the Court explained that a federal taxpayer may challenge a
federal statute if there is (a) a nexus between taxpayer status and the type of legislative
enactment he challenges and (b) a nexus between taxpayer status and the nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged. Flast,392 U.S. at 102. The first nexus was met in Flast
because the taxpayer challenged a spending statute. Id. at 103. Likewise, the second nexus was
met because the Establishment Clause is aimed at curbing the government's use of the taxing
and spending power to aid religion. Id.
The Flastreasoning may be read as a "disingenuous" effort to distinguish Frothinghamand
other prior cases, Hein v. Freedom of Religion Foundation, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2577 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring), as a doctrinal framework that should be retained in a narrow category of
cases, id. at 2564-72 (plurality opinion), or as a general principle that ought to be extended to
other Establishment Clause cases, id. at 2584-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Court opinions, the majority and the dissent never join issue on the merits of
the practice. Doing so would require the Justices to acknowledge the existence
of the practice, thereby destroying its value. Traditional doctrinal scholars,
working from the internal point of view of a participant in the judicial process,
follow the Court's lead.1 65 For them, legal legitimacy is the norm the Court
must satisfy, and the reasons that were, or should have been, given in the
opinions are the only ones that count in making that judgment. Upon finding
that the Supreme Court has manipulated history, ignored its precedents, or
selectively invoked the constitutional text, commentators profess
disappointment 166 (or even shock) 167 at the Court's lack of craft. They infer
that the author of the majority opinion has either committed a regrettable
analytical error or deliberately flouted the law to achieve some impermissible
end. Champions of the Court's work rally to the defense and issues like fidelity
to precedent, the framers' intent, and the proper application of the Court's
formulae are thoroughly aired. Whether the debate is carried on in the Justices'
concurring and dissenting opinions or in legal scholarship, the participants
concentrate on the viability of the Court's reasoning, the thoroughness of its
research, and the plausibility of the judgments it makes on the way to its
outcome. 168 Whatever their differences, all sides share the premise that the
grounds given in the opinion are, or ought to be, the grounds for decision. The
debate precedes from the assumption that judicial reasoning either is, or is not,
legally legitimate. The difficulty with such reasoning, of course, is that it
wrongly omits sociological legitimacy from the analytical toolbox. The mostcriticized features of opinions may well result from conscious judicial efforts to
maximize public acceptance, regardless of legal legitimacy.
As for the skeptics, they reject legal legitimacy and systematically doubt
the Court's proffered reasons. Noting that law is a social phenomenon, they
typically focus their effort on looking outside the opinions for explanations of
165. See POSNER, supra note 138, at 83-91, 94-95 (identifying the features of doctrinal
scholarship and contrasting it with other types of scholarship).
166. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 48, at 947 (noting that the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
is "bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be"); Hart, supranote 49, at 100 ("Regretfully
and with deference, it has to be said that too many of the Court's opinions are about what one
would expect could be written in twenty-four hours.").
167. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Supreme Court: Should We Trust Judges?, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2000, at M1 (expressing outrage over Bush v. Gore); Vincent Bugliosi, None Dare
Call It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11, 14 (same); Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18 (same).
168. See, for example, the essays collected in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME
COURT (C. Sunstein & R. Epstein eds., 2001) (attacking and defending Bush v. Gore on a
variety of grounds).
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outcomes and simply dismiss the Court's opinions as rationalizations, or as
expressions of the Justices' ideology. 169 Yet this sweeping skepticism leads to
a dead end for anyone seeking insights into the judicial process, because it fails
to take legal argument seriously. Ronald Dworkin explains how the skeptics go
wrong:
Legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena, is argumentative.

Every actor in the practice understands that what it permits or requires
depends on the truth of certain propositions that are given sense only by
and within the practice; the practice consists in large part in deploying and
arguing about these propositions ....Theories that ignore the structure of
legal argument for supposedly larger questions of history and society are
therefore perverse. They ignore questions about the internal character1 70of
legal argument, so their explanations are impoverished and defective.
Dworkin, of course, believes that the skeptics err in trying to explain outcomes
by looking outside the legal materials. For present purposes it is not necessary
to take sides on that issue. Whether or not the true answers to legal questions
are found in legal materials, the skeptics misapprehend the nature of legal
practice. Lacking interest in the reasons set forth in the opinions, they have no
occasion to assess the merits of opinion-writing strategies.
This part of the article sets aside global skepticism, challenges the
doctrinal scholar's disdain for sociological legitimacy, and addresses three
normative issues raised by appearance management: (A) Do the constraints
imposed by legal legitimacy necessarily preclude the Court from giving reasons
aimed at satisfying its audience rather than the ones that do the work of
deciding the case? (B) May opinions be evaluated according to how well or
poorly they manage appearances? (C) What are the tradeoffs between
appearance management and other goals?
A. AppearanceManagement Versus JudicialCandor
Complaints by scholars about poorly crafted opinions may come down to
disagreement with the Court's agenda. In Professor Fallon's vocabulary, the
Court is, to some degree, concerned with "sociological legitimacy," while
scholars demand "legal legitimacy."' 17' According to the scholarly tradition,
169. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 165 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993)
(describing the Realists' account of the gap between the content of opinions and the factors that
determine outcomes).
170. DwoRKiN, supra note 43, at 13-14.
171. See supra notes 10-12,31-41 and accompanying text (distinguishing between these
two forms of appearance management).
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judges are virtually always obliged to be candid. They violate this norm when
they give reasons that diverge from the reasons that account for the outcome.
Appearance management serves the goal of sociological legitimacy; it is
anathema to legal legitimacy. But this dichotomy does not surface in doctrinal
scholarship. Commentators do not conceive of legitimacy as a multi-faceted
concept, do not examine the implications of sociological legitimacy, and rarely
consider any arguments in favor of appearance management. Working within
the realm of legal legitimacy as their analytical framework, they believe the
candor requirement silences any discussion of whether the reasons given in the
opinion may diverge from the ones that decide the case. The whole argument
rests on the premise that legal legitimacy necessarily overrides the sociological
version.
Offering both ethical and utilitarian arguments, David Shapiro defends a
strong norm ofjudicial candor against suggestions that it may appropriately be
sacrificed for other goals.172 He argues that "The case for honesty in all human
173
relations... rests in part on the importance of treating others with respect."'
A "lack of candor often carries with it the implication that the listener is less
capable of dealing with the truth, and thus less worthy of respect, than the
speaker."' 174 Besides the ethical argument, the case for candor "also rests on a
more instrumental ground: the need for trust in the carrying on of human
affairs."' 175 Supreme Court opinions serve as an essential resource for
participants in the legal process. Legal materials-constitutional text structure
and history, precedents, principles embedded in and derived from authoritative
sources, and the like-fumish the legitimate reasons for outcomes. The point
of the opinion is to show how the Court reasoned its way through those
materials to the holding. 176 Lawyers rely upon opinions in crafting arguments,
lower-court judges look to them for guidance, and scholars take the Court's
reasoning as the starting point for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of its
effort. Everyone working within the system must begin from the presumption
that the Court is sincere in setting forth reasons. In order to satisfy these needs,
the Court should identify the relevant legal materials and apply them to the
issues before the Court. Justices who fail to carry out this task should be called
to account for incompetence, inattention to craft, or deliberate lawlessness.
172. Shapiro, supra note 46, at 736.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 736-37.
175. Id. at 737.
176. See Charles Fried, Scholars andJudges: Reason andPower,23 HARv. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 807, 824 (2000) (suggesting that, absent a reasoned opinion justifying the outcome,
judges would "forfeit the claim that they depend not on will but on reason").
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Opinions must be candid so that critics have the materials necessary to do their
work. 177 The only exception that Shapiro would make to a general obligation
moral duty to
ofjudicial candor is for rare situations in which an extraordinary
78
lie overrides a legal right to hear truth from the judge.1
Professor Shapiro's argument is unassailable so long as one accepts his
premise that the pursuit of legal legitimacy is the sole aim of opinion writing,
save the unusual case involving a compelling moral value. But this premise
ignores the critical role of public acceptance in shoring up the Court's
credibility and effectiveness. 79 Legal legitimacy, however admirable as an
ideal, is worth little standing alone. The Court learned in the 1930s that it
cannot afford to ignore public perceptions. It almost found itself turned into a
puppet by a popular President irked by its rulings, and was saved only by a
combination of prudent retreat and a reservoir of public support.' 80 Absent
public acceptance, the Court will struggle to achieve substantive goals, and will
be constantly vulnerable to attack by the other branches.
For this reason, the Court is on solid ground in ranking sociological
legitimacy ahead of legal legitimacy, even at the cost of constant criticism from
the academy for failure to meet legal requirements. Recognizing a primary role
for sociological legitimacy lays the groundwork for a strong instrumental
argument against candor and in favor of appearance management. Absent
public acceptance, the Court cannot be effective. Yet society benefits from the
enforcement of "rule of law" values by a strong judicial branch, even if the
Court itself sometimes falls short of perfect fidelity to law. The Court's
solution is to appear to be principled.' 8 1 Sociological legitimacy always
demands attention to appearances at some cost to legal legitimacy, as the point
of sociological legitimacy is to win a measure of acceptance from diverse

177. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L.
REv. 1, 25 (1979) (suggesting that the practice of omitting from opinions factors relied upon by
Justices is "wholly inconsistent with the root concepts of principled decision-making"); see also
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630,636 (1958) (arguing that "when men are compelled to explain and defend their decisions,
the effect will generally be to pull those decisions toward goodness").
178. See Shapiro, supra note 46, at 739-50 (arguing that an inescapable moral duty may
justify a departure from judicial candor).
179. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1805 (suggesting that "[w]ith respect to the most
fundamental matters, sociological legitimacy is not only a necessary condition of legal
legitimacy, but also a sufficient one").
180. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 324-25 & n.378 ("[P]opular sentiment for the
independent judiciary likely saved it in the face of the politicians' attack in 1937.").
181. See Posner, supra note 1, at 51-52 (noting that "the appearance of being 'principled'
is rhetorically and politically effective").
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audiences who do not agree on what qualifies as a legally
legitimate argument.
82
Sacrificing candor is the unavoidable consequence.'
Shapiro's ethical argument fares no better. As with his instrumental case
for candor, it assumes that legal legitimacy is the only norm the Justices must
satisfy, moral duties aside. Yet the Court, in order to husband its authority,
must also pursue sociological legitimacy. Recognizing as much adds a layer of
complexity to the ethical issue. The justification for dissembling is that it
shows no lack of respect to give people the reasons they demand to hear. 83
Nor is the audience always deceived. On the contrary, the Court's primary
audience consists of legal elites who will typically understand well enough that
the opinion does not tell the whole story of how the Court arrived at its
outcome. 184 Most legal elites are perceptive enough to grasp the truth of the
"external" perspective taken by skeptics. At the same time, they take an
"internal" perspective on the judicial process in their working lives. Experience
has taught them to conceive of the Court's reasons not so much as
pronouncements etched in stone, but as weapons to be manipulated as the needs
of a given piece of litigation or scholarship require.
An uncompromising champion of candor would look for ways of ensuring
that the Court obeys the candor norm, by obliging the Justices to practice
greater transparency. For example, the public could be given access to internal
memoranda related to its decision making, and clerks could be encouraged to
discuss their experiences in the public forum. Yet neither Professor Shapiro
nor anyone else advocates more openness.185 It is as if the demand for candor
182. Accordingly, my claim for the role of appearance management in Supreme Court
opinions differs radically from the thesis advanced in Deborah Hellman, The Importance of
Appearing Principled,37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1107 (1995). Professor Hellman defends the Court's
"claim that an opinion must lookprincipledaswell as beprincipledinorder to legitimately and
justifiably fulfill the judicial function." Id.at 1108. Her reasoning, as I understand it, is that
both criteria should be met. I argue that "looking principled" can conflict with "being
principled" and that the former takes priority over the latter in a significant range of Supreme
Court cases.
183. Cf GOFFMAN, supranote 13, at 18 (arguing that people who dissemble in their work
may do so for reasons other than selfish ones; thus "[w]e know that in service occupations
practitioners who may otherwise be sincere are sometimes forced to delude their customers
because their customers show such a heartfelt demand for it").
184. See supranote 133 and accompanying text (discussing the role of legal elites).
185. On the contrary, some of them vehemently object to insiders who lift the curtain on
the Court's work, a bit like the bishops who refused to look through Galileo's telescope for fear
they may see something that contradicted their model of the cosmos. See, e.g., Painter, supra
note 107 (reviewing EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS AccoUNT
OF THE EPic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998)). Professor Painter criticizes
Lazarus, a former clerk for Justice Blackmun, for "ethical lapses" in revealing confidential
information. Id. at 1434. See also David J. Garrow, "The Lowest Form ofAnimal Life"?:
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were more a rhetorical stance than a practical objective.1 6 One force driving
judicial appearance management may be the psychological need of some
judges, law professors, lawyers, and other opinion leaders to believe that
conventional reasons account for the holdings of hard cases. 187 As for the
general public, most of them pay little attention to the particulars of Supreme
Court opinions)188 All the same, it seems unlikely that many of them are
deceived. Most people are familiar with the ways of the world and probably
benefit from a healthy skepticism as to whether the Court is, or always should
be, completely straightforward. With regard to all segments of the audience,
the Court's practice of offering them the argument they want to hear seems
more accurately described as deferring to their preferences than as manifesting
lack of respect.
These objections do not categorically refute the case for candor. Legal
legitimacy is a worthy goal and our system includes means by which it will,
more or less, receive its due. Dissenting Justices, aided by an army of legal
scholars, stand ready to call attention to the Court's failures to state the true
reasons for decisions. Indeed, scholars sometimes disapprove of the reasoning
put forward by the Court to justify outcomes they like. In that event, their
Supreme Court Clerks andSupreme Court History, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 855,856-57 nn.5-15
(1999) (citing published criticisms of Lazarus's work); Painter, supra note 107, at nn.3-4
(same).
186. One need not question the sincerity of those who lament the indiscretions of Lazarus
and others in order to point out that, viewed from the perspective of appearance management,
the social norm against such disclosures is best understood as a way of protecting the Court's
secrets in order that it be more effective at putting on a show for its audience. As Goffman puts
it:
A basic problem for many performances... is that of information control; the
audience must not acquire destructive information about the situation that is being
defined for them. In other words, a team must be able to keep its secrets and have
its secrets kept.
GOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 141.
187. See NYBERG, supra note 74, at 92-93 (describing the psychological desire to avoid
"explicit consciousness" of certain thoughts and ideas). For example, it appears that in many, if
not all the Justices' chambers, the law clerks draft the opinions, often with little or no editing by
the Justices. See Garrow, supra note 185, at 865 & n.72, 872, 874 & n. 131 (1999) (noting the
substantive impact of law clerks on draft opinions). Granting that the Justices themselves
determine the outcomes of the cases, law clerks are responsible for much of the reasoning in the
opinions. Id. Yet later opinions often claim that the outcome is governed not by the results but
by the reasoning of earlier cases. To the extent this is so, it seems to follow that the clerks bear
substantial responsibility for the outcomes of later cases. To the extent it is not so, the
reasoning is fairly regarded as window dressing for more or less naked value judgments.
188. See Barry Friedman, MediatedPopularConstitutionalism,101 MICH. L. REv. 2596,
2621-23 (2003) (discussing the lack of detailed understanding of Supreme Court rulings among
the general public).
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concern with legal legitimacy comes to the fore, and the scholarly project may
consist of rewriting the opinions in ways that seem to them to better satisfy the
requirements of legal legitimacy. 89 In addition to doctrinal scholarship, the
papers of retired Justices, biographies, and books that go behind the scenes of
the contemporary Court to reveal details about its work are helpful correctives
to anyone who thinks that the opinion
is a transparent window into the reality of
90
process.'
making
decision
the
Nonetheless, the case for candor-and against appearance managementis less certain than Professor Shapiro supposes. Both legal and sociological
legitimacy have value, and the need for one or the other may vary depending on
context. There is no "one size fits all" answer to the question whether the Court
ought to engage in appearance management in a given case. Rather than asking
whether legal or sociological legitimacy takes priority, the questions the Court
and its academic overseers should ask include whether in the case at hand there
is a way to sidestep the need to choose between them, and if not, how to choose
between them in a given set of circumstances, and whether in a particular case
the motive for appearance management is a worthy one. Here are some
illustrations.
1. Avoiding the Conflict Between Legal and SociologicalLegitimacy
Sometimes conflicts between the legal and sociological legitimacy can be
avoided by clever opinion writing. Ex parte McCardle'9 1 illustrates the
technique.
After the Civil War, Congress, as part of the post-war
Reconstruction program, imposed military government in the South. 92
McCardle, a Mississippi newspaper editor, ran afoul of the military rulers, was
imprisoned by the army, and challenged the Reconstruction scheme on
constitutional grounds. 193 He appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867
statute.' 94 When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Congress feared
189. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting scholarly attempts to rewrite
landmark decisions).
190. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, The BrainsBehindBlackmun, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June
2005, at 28 (observing that a "troubling story emerges from the pages of Blackmun's papers,
one that remains almost wholly unreported"). According to Garrow, Blackmun "ceded to his
law clerks much greater control over his judicial work than did any of the other 15 judges from
the last half-century whose papers are available." Id.
191. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
192. Id. at 507.
193. Id. at 508.
194. Id. at 507.
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that the Court would overturn its program, and responded by repealing the
relevant portion of the 1867 statute, thereby depriving the Court of the
jurisdiction McCardle asserted. 9 5 The Court, probably influenced by fear that
Congress would retaliate against it for an insufficiently deferential ruling, held
that the statute validly deprived it of jurisdiction, declaring unequivocally:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can
only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express
words. 196

Then, at the end of the opinion, the Court remarked that the jurisdictionlimiting statute applied only to the 1867 statute and "does not affect the
jurisdiction which was previously exercised."' 97 The opinion abruptly ends,
without commenting on whether Congress could block the alternative avenue as
well. 198 The point of this opaque reference became clear when, a year later, the
Court in Ex parte Yerger 99 upheld access to habeas by way of the route
Congress had failed to cut off.200 As a result, one cannot tell for sure whether
McCardle is extraordinarily broad or quite narrow. 2 0 1 A fair reading of
McCardle, though certainly not the only plausible one, is that the Court
employed deliberate ambiguity to spare itself the hard choice between the
"legally legitimate" reason for the outcome (that Congress had in fact merely
foreclosed one avenue of access) and the one that would satisfy its most
important audience, made up of ardent congressional defenders of
Reconstruction and the equally ardent voters who had put them in office (that
Congress possesses absolute power over the Court's jurisdiction). 0 2 In this
view of the case, the Court showed judicial statesmanship, grasping the need to
maintain its institutional role while avoiding an unnecessary confrontation with
Congress.
195. Id. at 508.
196. Id. at 514.
197. Id. at 515. At this point, the Court dropped a footnote citing an earlier round in the
McCardle litigation.
198. For a brief discussion, see R. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

330 n.*** (5th ed. 2003).

199. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1869) (requiring unambiguous
congressional intent to restrict the Court's jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus).
200. Id.
201. For a broad reading, see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of FederalCourt
Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departuresfrom the Constitutional Plan, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1515, 1601-05 (1986).
202. William Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 229,
247-48 (1973).
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2. Weighing the Costs andBenefits of Appearance Management

McCardle aside, conflicts between the demands of legal and sociological
legitimacy cannot always be dodged. One set of reasons will reflect the Court's
thinking and another will have greater appeal for its audience, and the Court
will have to decide between them. The wisdom of its choice depends on how
well it assesses the costs and the benefits of opting for appearance management
in a given circumstance. Despite later academic criticisms, the 1954 Court can
hardly be faulted for resorting to social science evidence in Brown v. Boardof
Education.20 3 Squarely stating a general prohibition on invidious race
discrimination, with its implication of drastic and sudden social change, would
have further inflamed an already tense situation in the South. For somewhat
different reasons, the Court probably made the right choice in West Coast Hotel
2 4
v. Parrish,
where it began dismantling the economic due process doctrine
that had grown increasingly controversial in the 1930s. Under threat of
Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the Court purported to apply the settled
doctrine, but subtly reformulated it without calling attention to the change.0 5
In this way it gave the impression of continuity when in fact a radical break had
occurred. Announcing forthrightly an abrupt doctrinal transformation would
have indicated weakness on the Court's part, perhaps with good reason. In
such a situation, the Court's institutional needs come to the fore. Dependent on
public confidence for its continuing authority, the Court was obliged to save
face.
203. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 n.1 1 (1954) (citing scientific evidence
detailing the psychological impact of discrimination and segregation).
204. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state minimum wage law).
205. In the era of "economic substantive due process," the Court curbed the power of
legislatures to regulate economic activity, on the theory that regulation may violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on depriving persons of "liberty" or "property" without
due process of law. In one well-known case from the period, the Court struck down a New
York law that had limited bakers to working no more than ten hours a day or no more than sixty
hours in any one week, finding that there was "no reasonable foundation for holding this to be
necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard... the health of the individuals who are
following the trade of a baker." See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
When the Court changed direction, it did not abruptly overrule the earlier cases. Though
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) upheld legislative regulation of milk prices against a
substantive due process challenge, the opinion retained the old formula. As always, validation
required that "the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be attained." Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525. At the same time, and of greater long-term significance,
"the decision undertook little independent examination of the economic rationality of the
legislation, nor did it undertake to answer the dissent's critique of its economic premises."
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTIUTIONAL LAW 376 (16th ed. 2007).
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In other cases it is not so clear in retrospect that the appearance
management strategy was the right one. Flastv. Cohen20 6 was a suit by federal
taxpayers objecting on First Amendment Establishment Clause grounds to a
statute that provided financial support for educational programs in religious
schools. The obstacle they faced was Frothingham v. Mellon,20 7 which had
held that suits by federal taxpayers challenging congressional expenditures are
nonjusticiable.2 °s The problem is that the taxpayer's interest is infinitesimal, in
that a victory will likely not affect the amount he owes. 20 9 Despite that
precedent, the Court permitted the case to go forward.21 0 Chief Justice
Warren's opinion for the Court explained that Flast was different from
21
Frothingham.
In order for a federal taxpayer to have standing, the Court
explained, he must meet a two-prong test:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the
type of legislative enactment attacked ....Secondly, the taxpayer must
establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged.21 2
Both nexus requirements were satisfied in Flast,the Court reasoned.21 3 There
is a link between taxpayer status and spending statutes, and between taxpayer
status and establishment clause claims. The first prong was met, but the latter
prong was lacking in Frothingham,as there had been no allegation there that
Congress
"had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing and spending
2 14
power.,
206. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (upholding taxpayer standing to
challenge federal spending under the Establishment Clause).
207. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 483 (1923) (finding that taxpayers must
demonstrate injury in order to challenge congressional spending).
208. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85 (discussing "whether the Frothingham barrier should be
lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment").
209. See Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487 (noting that a taxpayer's interest in the treasury's
funds is "comparatively minute and indeterminable").
210. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 94 ("Whatever the merits of the current debate over
Frothingham,its very existence suggests that we should undertake a fresh examination of the
limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court and the application of those limitations to
taxpayer suits.").
211. Id.at 91-94 (noting that the assumptions underlying the Frothinghamdecision are
"not consistent with modem conditions").
212. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
213. Id. at 103.
214. Id. at 105. The taxpayer in Frothinghamhad challenged a statute that provided funds
to pregnant women and infants, on the ground that it was not authorized by any of Congress's
Article I (or any of its other) powers. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
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This two-prong test was made up by the FlastCourt and seemed to do the
job for which it was devised: It permitted the Establishment Clause challenge
to be litigated, while giving the appearance of respect for precedent.
Nonetheless, it was an exercise in appearance management, for the driving
force behind the outcome was a judgment on the part of the majority that
Establishment Clause challenges ought to be adjudicated despite the plaintiff
taxpayer's lack of a substantial interest in the outcome. The difficulty with it
became clear some years later, when a newly constituted Court heard a claim
that was similar in policy terms but sufficiently different on the facts to permit
Flastto be distinguished. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,215 taxpayers sought to
challenge on Establishment Clause grounds a decision by federal officials to
transfer property to a religious college.21 6 In substance, the plaintiffs' interest
in raising their First Amendment claim is virtually identical to that of the
plaintiffs in Flast. The policy behind Flast of opening the federal courts to
adjudication of such claims is as applicable to Valley Forge as it was to
Flast.217 But the majority, preferring to curb the powers of the federal courts in
this area, found it easy to distinguish Flast. The first Flastprong was not met,
because the plaintiffs challenged the act of executive branch officials, not an act
of Congress.21 8 The distinction is specious, but it was the FlastCourt's failure
to state its reasons more candidly that made the earlier case vulnerable to such
distinctions. In retrospect, Chief Justice Warren and his allies in the Flast
majority would have built a sturdier shield for the rule of that case by openly
breaking with Frothinghamfor Establishment Clause claims.21 9
3. Appearance Management Abuses
Legal practice consists mainly of arguments over the implications of
precedents, statutes, and other legal materials on the issue at hand. Participants
disagree about the content and relevance of those materials, but they share the
premise that there exists a "canon of acceptable arguments," so that some
215. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge the transfer of
federal property from the executive branch to a religious organization).
216. Id. at469.
217. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that appellants satisfied Flast'sstandards).
218. Id. at479.
219. For the theoretical underpinnings of the rights-based argument the Court might have
advanced, see William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
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arguments are out-of-bounds. 220 They condemn the judge who takes bribes in
exchange for his vote, or who favors whites over blacks, or who rules against
his personal enemy. Throughout this Article, my premise has been that the true
reasons for outcomes are within the canon, though they may be too
controversial for unadorned presentation in the opinions. But the unscrupulous
judge may employ appearance management to hide reprehensible reasons as
well.221 By teaching judges that they should not adopt reasons they would be
ashamed to state in their opinions, a strong norm of judicial candor helps to
combat departures from the canon of acceptable arguments. One of the costs of
tolerating appearance management is that the more ubiquitous the practice
becomes, the easier it will be for badly-motivated judges to conceal reasons that
are out-of-bounds. When the reader cannot trust any of the opinions to give the
real reasons, it may become harder to detect the opinion that hides unacceptable
reasons.
Some commentators maintain that Bush v. Gore222 is such a case.
Following a very close presidential election in Florida, the Florida Elections
Canvassing Commission declared George W. Bush the winner.223 At the behest
of Vice President Gore's campaign, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a
recount, approved a process under which recounts may be conducted under
different standards from one county to another, and ruled that a "legal vote is
one in which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter."' 224 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lack of uniform standards violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 225 Five of the Justices-all appointed by Republican
Presidents-ruled that it was too late for a properly conducted recount to go
forward. 226 Across the ideological spectrum, commentators faulted the Court's
equal protection reasoning, charging that it "had no basis in precedent or in
220. Michael Wells, Naked Politics,Federal Courts Law, and the Canon ofAcceptable
Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 89 (1998).
221. Judge Posner identifies this risk, pointing out that the Justice who is especially
talented at appearance management presents the greatest danger. See Posner, supranote 1, at
78-79 (pointing out that "better packaging could be dangerous-could enable the Justices to get
away with being more aggressive than if they didn't hide the ball as skillfully").
222. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
223. Id. at 101.
224. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (2000).
225. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-09 (noting that "the standards for accepting or rejecting
contested ballots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single county
from one recount team to another").
226. See id. at 110-11 ("[I]t is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance
with the requirements of equal protection."). On this point, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 129. As to the equal protection ruling, only Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 143-44.
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at best, which deserves much
history, ' ,227 and calling it "a confused nonstarter
228
of the scorn that has been heaped upon it.

But for some critics the Court did not merely err; the five Justices who
stopped the recount so ruled because they preferred that Bush become
President. 229 The decision was a "disgrace,'' 30 the Court had "trampled on...
basic principles of adjudication,, 231 and "Scalia, Thomas et al., are criminals in
the very truest sense of the word. 2 32 Akhil Amar lamented that he must now
tell his students to "[p]ut not their trust in judges. 2 33 These accusations may
well be overblown. Pamela Karlen-no right-winger-rejected the notion that
Bush v. Gore was aberrant, though she found fault with the substance of the
equal protection doctrine it reflects. 234 Be that as it may, the point is that false
reasons may be set forth in an effort to conceal motives that deserve
condemnation, and perhaps Bush v. Gore illustrates the danger. It does not
follow, however, that the danger is sufficiently great to justify an effort to
impose a blanket obligation ofjudicial candor on the Supreme Court. 3 5 Even
if Bush qualifies as an abuse, instances of out-of-bounds appearance
management are rare. Under the watchful eyes of dissenting Justices and
vigilant scholars, Supreme Court majorities are unlikely to try to make a habit
227. Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 757, 758 (2001).
228. Richard A. Epstein, "InSuch Manner as the LegislatureThereofMay Direct": The
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT 14 (C.
Sunstein & R. Epstein eds., 2001).
229. The two sides of the controversy over the legitimacy of the Court's ruling are
at 1-8.
described in Cass Sunstein, Introduction: Of Law and Politics, in THE VOTE; id.
230. Rosen, supra note 167, at 18.
231. Herman Schwartz, The God That Failed,THE NATION, Jan. 1,2001, at 5-6.
232. Bugliosi, supra note 167, at 11.
233. Amar, supra note 167, at MI. See also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffinan, A Window into
the Courts: LegalProcessandthe2000 PresidentialElection, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1533, 155255 (2001) (reviewing SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (2001)).
234. Pamela S. Karlen, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a
ChangeableCourt, in THE VOTE, supranote 228, at 77-78. My own view is that the alternative
argument Chief Justice Rehnquist laid out in his concurring opinion furnishes a persuasive
rationale for the outcome. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,

concurring) (stating that the Florida Supreme Court acted contrary to the Florida legislature's
intent); see also Michael L. Wells & Jeffry M. Netter, Article 1Hand the FloridaElection Case:
A Public Choice Perspective,61 MD. L. REv. 711,727-32 (2002) (attempting to bolster Chief
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning).
235. Though abuses may undermine the "diffuse support" that is the bedrock of the Court's
sociological legitimacy, the costs of perceived abuses and the benefits of taking steps to prevent
them may be exaggerated by opinion leaders who are outraged by a particular ruling. Bush v.
Gore seems to have done little damage to the Court's "diffuse support" among the public at
large. Friedman, supranote 8, at 326 & n.388.
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of it. If we think of the Court as a team engaged in appearance management,
the role of the doctrinal scholar vis-A-vis the Court's opinions resembles that of
"the person who is hired to check up on the standards that performers maintain
in order to insure' 23that
in certain respects fostered appearances will not be too
6
far from reality.
B. Skillful and Clumsy Appearance Management
If the Court must sustain its sociological legitimacy in order to be
effective, and if shrewd appearance management is the path to sociological
legitimacy, then skill at managing appearances ought to serve as one measure of
judicial performance. Accepting appearance management as a necessary part of
opinion-writing implies that the traditional standards by which opinions are
evaluated should be modified. Scholars seeking to determine the real-world
merits of an opinion should evaluate it with sociological legitimacy in mind.
To the extent the opinion is an exercise in appearance management, its focus is
not on reasoning from the legal materials to the holding, but on identifying
reasons that will appeal to the Court's audience. Naturally, opinions written
with this aim in mind will not meet the exacting criteria of the rigorous
doctrinal analyst. Many analytical flaws result from the sacrifice of legal
legitimacy for the sake of giving reasons that will appeal to the audience. A
realistic assessment of judicial opinions would not concentrate solely on
whether the Court's holdings and reasoning meet the demands of legal
legitimacy. In addition, a realistic assessment would consider how well a given
opinion manages appearances. 237 In general, sociological legitimacy requires
that the opinion emphasize reasons that can attract broad support over those
that are more controversial. Even a bold substantive ruling may be defended in
ways that are more or less open to attack along these lines, and some Justices
succeed better than others at artfully highlighting the reasons that can attract
support while concealing from public view the most controversial aspects of the
rationale.
Compare the opinions of Justices Douglas and Harlan in Griswold v.
Connecticut.238 There, the state had criminalized the provision of birth control
236. GOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 147. In this regard, the honest scholar should be
distinguished from the "shill," who "is someone who acts as though he were an ordinary
member of the audience but is in fact in league with the performers." Id. at 146.
237. See also supra Part IV.A (discussing how a realistic assessment of the Court's
holdings would entertain the argument that the latter good might take priority over the former).
238. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that a state law
forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally interferes with the right to marital
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devices to married couples. 239 The issue was whether the statute violated any
constitutional limit on state authority.2 40 Nothing in the text of the Constitution
explicitly constrains state power on this topic, yet the Court was determined to
strike down the statute. 24' The obvious candidate was substantive due process,
as some precedents supported its application to the birth control statute. In
Piercev. Society of Sisters,242 the Court had ruled that the state could not oblige
parents to send their children to public rather than private schools. And Meyer
v. Nebraska24 3 held that the state may not punish a teacher for teaching the
German language. The appearance management problem with relying on
substantive due process was that thirty years earlier, during the New Deal,
substantive due process had acquired a bad reputation. It was used by
conservative justices in the first third of the twentieth century to strike down
economic and social legislation aimed at ameliorating harsh working conditions
and increasing workers' bargaining
power. The Court had repudiated that use
44
of the doctrine in the late 1930s.2
For this reason, in writing for the Court, Justice Douglas eschewed the
substantive due process route.245 He mentioned Meyer and Pierce,but ignored
their substantive due process pedigree 46 Instead he tried to devise a new
rationale, declaring that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. 24 7 Thus, "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. 248
These include the First Amendment, with its implicit "right of association," the
Third Amendment, "in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any

privacy).
239. Id.at 480.
240. Id.
241. Id.at 482.
242. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (recognizing a parent's liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education
of their children).
243. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down a state law
forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in public schools on grounds that it violates the
liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
244. See SuLrvAN & GUNTHER, supranote 60, at 144-48 (documenting the Court's shift
on Commerce Clause issues); id.at 503-09 (noting the shift on due process issues).
245. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions.").
246. Id.at 482-83.
247. Id. at 484.

248.

Id.
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house' in time of peace," the Fourth Amendment, in forbidding unreasonable
searches, and the Fifth Amendment, in recognizing the right against selfincrimination.249 Turning to the birth control issue, Justice Douglas next
asserted that the case "concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees," and that this "right
of privacy" was violated by the Connecticut statute.25 °
Justice Harlan's opinion concurring in the judgment took a different tack.
Rather than avoiding substantive due process, he stoutly embraced it and took
advantage of our legal culture's sympathy for arguments based on history.22515
Stressing the novelty of Connecticut's statute and the tradition of governmental
respect for marital privacy, he maintained that the law violated a longestablished aspect of the substantive "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause. 252 He relied directly on Meyer and Pierce, and distinguished the
economic due process cases on the ground that they were not rooted in longstanding practice.253 Harlan took care to fend off concerns that the Court was
arrogating power to itself 25 4 Striking down the Connecticut law, he assured the
reader, would not necessarily produce other limits on the state's power over
sexual matters, for nonmarital sex did not enjoy the history of state
noninterference on which he grounded his reasoning.255
Each of these opinions pushed toward exactly the same substantive
outcome in Griswold. Moreover, each was and is vulnerable to attack on legal
legitimacy grounds. Neither of them had plausible textual support. Nor is there
249. Id.at 484-85.
250. Id.at 485-86.
251. Justice Harlan had addressed the merits of the Connecticut statute a few years earlier,
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), a case the Court
dismissed onjusticiability grounds. His brief opinion in Griswoldrefersthe reader to the earlier
opinion for an extended discussion of his views. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (referencing Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe).
252. Id.at 500 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in
this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."').
253. Id.(Harlan, J., concurring).
254. Id.at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) (declaring that judicial self-restraint in due process
cases will only be achieved "by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history,
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great
roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and
preserving American freedoms").
255. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 539-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing marital
privacy from those "established intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which can
have no claim to social protection").
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any indication that the framers of the Constitution intended to protect marital
privacy, especially with respect to twentieth century birth control devices. For
that matter, Justice Harlan never directly suggested that they did. Stripping
away Justice Douglas's references to a variety of provisions and Justice
Harlan's discussion of history reveals that each Justice's opinion reflects an
assertion of judicial power to identify constitutional rights not explicitly
recognized in the document's text.256 Yet the test of sociological legitimacy is
not whether the legal foundations of the ruling are sound, but whether the
reasoning can obtain wide public acceptance. Justice Harlan's opinion was an
especially effective exercise in appearance management, creating a sense of
continuity with the past and caution in identifying new constitutional rights,
even while articulating one. Justice Douglas's references to penumbras and
emanations have proved less convincing. 257 Indeed, they have vanished from
the constitutional lexicon. Later cases have by and large followed Justice
Harlan, making it clear that the right recognized in Griswold indeed finds its
constitutional basis in the substantive protection of "liberty" afforded by the
Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.258
C. The Trade-OffBetween Appearance Management and the Optimum
Substantive Outcome
Even when the reasons set forth in Supreme Court opinions are show
horses rather than work horses, they will influence the later development of
doctrine because lower courts and litigants are entitled and obliged to take them
seriously, to use them in framing arguments, and to cite them in justifying
256. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(addressing these and other separate opinions).
257. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 131, 135-36 (1988) (arguing that Justice Douglas's "attempt to arrive at
marital privacy through an exegesis of the Bill of Rights simply does not persuade"); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 802 (1989) (suggesting that "what
drove privacy into the penumbras... was a perceived need to differentiate the privacy doctrine
from the language of substantive due process"). Rubenfeld further notes that "this insecurity on
privacy's part... resulted in the very thing feared; by resorting to shadows, the right to privacy
has simply invited critics to expose it-and to brand it, of course, with the scarlet letter of
Lochnerism." Id. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics ofAmerican Law, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1047,
1113 (2002) ("Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court reads more like an amateur exercise in
metaphysical poetry than law .... Strikingly, though, his argument seems unpersuasive. The
reason is simple: it looks like all the reasoning is being done by a patchwork of images and
metaphors.").
258. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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holdings. As a result, substantive constitutional law may take one direction
rather than another on account of the impact of earlier appearance management
on later outcomes. One cannot reach a definitive judgment as to the wisdom of
a given instance of appearance management without considering the potential
substantive side effects.
Though it is too early to tell for certain, Grutterv. Bollinger,259 the Court's
most recent affirmative-action-in-higher-education case, may illustrate the
point. In an equal protection challenge, the Court upheld a University of
Michigan Law School admissions plan that favored minority students over
white students. 260 The black letter rule in this area is that racial classifications
are subject to strict scrutiny and can only be justified by a compelling state
interest.261 Before Grutter,the only government programs that had met this test
were affirmative action plans that compensated for past discrimination,262 and
the World War II internment of Japanese-Americans.26 3 The latter ruling had
met with withering criticism, 264 and the law school chose not to rely on the
compensatory rationale. Instead, Michigan argued that it had a compelling
interest in exposing law students to students with a variety of backgrounds and
perspectives and in training a diverse work force. 265 Agreeing that "the Law
School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body," the Court
upheld its admissions policy. 266 The law school's admissions process took a
number of factors into account under the general heading of diversity.26 7 By
contrast, in Gratz v. Bollinger,268 a companion case, the Court struck down an
259. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (finding that a law school had a
compelling interest in achieving diversity and that an individualized, race-conscious admissions
policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
260. Id.
261. Id.at 326.
262. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (rejecting a city plan requiring
government contractors to subcontract at least 30% of the value of each contract to minority
businesses); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,642 (1993) (finding that an "extremely irregular" and
racially-suspect North Carolina redistricting plan, serving no apparent compelling state interest,
could be challenged in court by citizens).
263. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) ("[W]e are unable to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.").
264. See generally GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE
EVACUATION (1949); Eugene V. Rostow, The JapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster,54 YALE
L.J. 489 (1945).
265. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-35 (2003).
266. Id.at 328-29.
267. Id.at 337.
268. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (finding that an undergraduate race-
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facially on race without giving
undergraduate admission plan that focused
269
weight to other elements of diversity.
Perhaps the majority takes diversity as seriously as the reasoning in the
Grutterand Gratz opinions suggests. Yet it is hard to believe that the benefits
of diversity count for enough to qualify as a compelling state interest as that
concept has been understood in the past. 2 10 In particular, the issue of raceconscious admissions only arose because Michigan had chosen to operate an
elite law school. Its interest in diversity could only be compelling on the
premise that it had a compelling interest in admitting an elite student body to
271
begin with, and this is an implausible proposition. Viewed as an exercise in
appearance management, the opinions in these cases make more sense. The
majority sought to achieve approval for admissions plans that focused on
helping minority students.272 A simple rule favoring such plans on
compensatory grounds, however, would have raised sociological legitimacy
objections, as many people object to taking race into account in such a bald
way.273 The Court deflected attacks on its endorsement of race-based
based admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity and, thus, violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
269. Id.at 275-76.
270. See Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Grutter or Otherwise: Racial
Preferences and Higher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 4 (2004) (characterizing the
diversity rationale as "window dressing"); see also id. at 5 ("Justice O'Connor's opinion
amounts to [saying] that if universities can disguise their admissions systems so that it is not too
blindingly obvious that they are pursuing racial representation for its own sake, they can get
away with it.").
271. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357-60 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is no pressing public necessity in maintaining a public law school at all and, it
dissenting)
follows, certainly not an elite law school."); see also id. at 387-89 (Kennedy, J.,
(questioning the Court's sincerity in advancing the diversity rationale); Robert P. George, Gratz
and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634, 1635 (2003) ("Given that
Michigan does not have anything that would qualify as a 'compelling' state interest in
establishing or maintaining an elite law school in the first place, how could it have a
'compelling' state interest in racial and ethnic diversity at that law school?"). Cf Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding that the interests of a child in avoiding social
stigmatization is not a compelling state interest that would justify taking race into account in
awarding custody when the parents divorce).
272. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out the tight correlation between the
percentage of each minority group in the applicant pool and the percentage of offers of
admission granted each minority group. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 381-85 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the law school "clearly does employ racial preferences in extending
offers of admission").
273. See Gail L. Heriot, Strict Scrutiny, Public Opinion, and Affirmative Action on
Campus: Should the Courts Finda Narrowly Tailored Solution to a Compelling Need in a
Policy Most Americans Oppose?, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 225-28 (2003) (citing public
opinion polls and other evidence for the assertion that most Americans oppose racial preference
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admissions by dressing the Grutter holding in diversity garb. The potential
problem is that the diversity reasoning has become part of constitutional
doctrine and can be advanced as a way of retarding as well as advancing the
Court's basic project. When "diversity" is a compelling state interest, the focus
on race may ultimately be diluted in favor of other goals.274 Moreover, some
helpful tools for increasing educational opportunities for blacks, such as racebased scholarships, may not withstand scrutiny under Grutter.275 Thus, the
unintended consequence of upholding race-conscious admissions on the
diversity rationale may be that the substantive goal of affirmative action for
blacks will be compromised.27 6
V. Conclusion
By stepping outside legal practice, taking an external perspective on the
Supreme Court, and viewing the Justices as fallible, ambitious, talented, and
risk-averse human beings, we can more fully understand the challenges they
face and the choices they make. In hard cases, Americans expect the Justices to
make wise substantive choices and to obey the law at the same time. The task
is daunting, partly because of sharp disagreements about what substantive
choices are wise, and partly because the legal justification of substantive rulings
often depends on controversial value judgments. The Court responds to these
difficulties by handing down opinions aimed at managing appearances and
winning public acceptance (and, hence, sociological legitimacy) rather than at
identifying the legal materials that produced the outcome (legal legitimacy). To
that end, the Court's reasons are sometimes show horses advanced for their
policies in higher education).
274. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions,103 COLuM. L. REv. 1622, 1622-25 (2003)
(discussing ways in which "diversity... avoid[s] addressing directly the barriers of race and
class); id. at 1625-28 (discussing the potential for more litigation on account of the distinction
the Court drew between Grutterand Gratz); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side ofGrutter, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 221, 239 (2004) (arguing that Grutter,in rejecting "unapologetically raceconscious" efforts, "consigns the concept of affirmative action to a role of marginal utility");
Daria Roithmayr, TackingLeft: A RadicalCritiqueofGrutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191,20811 (2004) ("Affirmative action to remedy past discrimination is too narrowly circumscribed in
employment and education to serve as the foundation for large-scale policy interventions.").
275. See Maurice R. Dyson, Towards an Establishment Clause Theory of Race-Based
Allocation: AdministeringRace-ConsciousFinancialAidAfterGrutter and Zelman, 14 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 237, 239 (2005) (noting that Grutterand Gratz "requires us to carefully ponder
whether to import race-conscious admissions principles into the financial aid context").
276. For another example of appearance management gone awry, see Rubenfeld, supra
note 257, and accompanying text (discussing the failure of appearance management in the right
to privacy cases).
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popular appeal, though they do not do the real work of deciding the case. Like
the staff of a hotel, a restaurant, or a law firm, the Court tries to manage the
impressions it makes on others while the work of determining how hard cases
should be decided, and why, goes on behind the scenes.
Appearance management implies that some types of argument-those that
are especially useful for satisfying an audience's expectations-figure more
prominently in the opinions than in actually producing the holdings of cases.
The converse is also true. Some principles exert far more influence on
decisionmaking than their treatment in Supreme Court opinions would suggest.
Because lower courts, lawyers, law teachers, and law students pay close
attention to the content of Supreme Court opinions, the Court's appearance
management techniques will color the whole legal culture. There is an irony
here. As between the appearance management reasons set forth in the opinions
and the genuine grounds for decisions, the former may influence the law that is
taught to students, the analysis contained in doctrinal scholarship, and lower
court adjudication more than the latter. Teachers risk losing the confidence of
students if they persistently declare that the real law is not to be found in the
opinions. No lawyer is likely to persuade judges by routinely questioning the
Court's sincerity, and a lower court judge who failed to frame his rulings in the
Court's terms would risk repudiation of his reasoning, if not outcomes.
Doctrinal scholarship simply cannot be done without (at least provisional)
respect for the doctrine. Even skeptics are obliged to take the Court's opinions
at face value as their working premise. As a result, appearance management
will have a big part in shaping the constitutional doctrine that guides briefwriting, doctrinal scholarship, and lower court opinions. Eleventh Amendment
scholarship illustrates the point.277 Whether or not history actually accounts for
much of the law of state sovereign immunity, it certainly figures prominently in
the scholarship in the area, thanks to the Supreme Court's focus on historical
arguments.
Some readers may reject this appearance management model of Supreme
Court practice as unduly cynical. In one respect, the charge of cynicism is on
target, as the appearance management thesis does reject the Court's claim of
fidelity to the rule of law in opinion-writing. On the other hand, showing that

277.

See generally James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory"

Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORIELL L. REv. 1269 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1
(1998); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretationofthe Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative Grant of
JurisdictionRather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983).
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the Court's reasons fall short does not imply that there are no good (albeit
unexpressed) reasons for the outcome.2 78 My thesis does not carry with it any
implication that the Court's true reasons are themselves illegitimate, or even
mistaken. My argument is that the genuine reasons, whatever their merit, give
rise to controversy the Court would prefer to sidestep.
Nor do I think that the Court deserves opprobrium for managing
appearances. On the contrary, the role of public attitudes in maintaining the
Court's authority suggests that appearance management is a vital feature of
Supreme Court decisionmaking, and one that deserves the attention the Court
accords it. It does and should take priority over legal legitimacy in a range of
controversial cases. In this crucial respect, my argument differs from the
Realists' critique of judicial opinions. The Realists fail to appreciate the
affirmative case for managing appearances. They believe that "by making each
decision seem inevitable, opinions deflect popular criticism of the courts'
rulings and conceal from the judges themselves the true bases of their
rulings., 279 On the contrary, opinions ordinarily serve a valuable social
function when they satisfy popular attitudes and thereby bolster the Court's
authority. The only exception is the rare case in which the Court manipulates
appearances to distract attention from unacceptable reasons, as some critics
think it did in Bush v. Gore.280 I plead guilty to skepticism, but not cynicism.
To the extent one's goal is to understand why opinions are written as they
are, the appearance management account of the content of opinions holds an
advantage over focusing exclusively on legal legitimacy, because it yields a
more plausible explanation for the chronic weakness of many Supreme Court
opinions in close cases. From one generation to the next, critics armed with
rule-of-law norms have no difficulty finding fault with the Court, often landing
telling blows. The reason is not that Supreme Court Justices are unable to write
candid and cogent majority opinions. It is that their agenda differs from that of
their critics. They are more concerned with sociological legitimacy.
Legal professionals-lawyers, lower court judges, and mainstream
scholars-are obliged to take the Court's legal legitimacy model as the set of
norms governing their daily work. No argument that fails to take the Court's
278. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 122, at 23-24 (noting a distinction between opinions
grounded in formal logic and opinions supported by other criteria).
279. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supranote 169, at 165. The context indicates that these
authors use "legitimation" in a different sense from Fallon's conception. They mean to get
across the idea that the "legitimacy" courts acquire by virtue of their opinions is based on a false
premise of fidelity to law.
280. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text (collecting criticisms of Bush v.
Gore).
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opinions at face value is likely to get anywhere. But practicing a healthy
skepticism toward the Court's proffered reasons will help them to do theirjobs
better. Certainly law teachers should teach law students "the judicial game," as
Judge Posner calls it. 28' But we owe them a more complete picture of the
judicial process. We should teach students to be at once skeptical of anything
they read in an opinion and wary of cynicism when they find that the Court
does not always mean what it says. They should learn that any piece of legal
analysis or argument they undertake ought to pay respect both to the Court's
stated reasons and to the often unstated or muted set of constitutional values
that does much of the work of deciding hard cases.

281. POSNER, supra note 138, at 8. Judge Posner uses the term "game" to denote the "set of
rules" that constitute an activity. Id. at 131-34.

NOTES

